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ARTICLE

Why Law Now Needs to Control Rather than
Follow Neo-Classical Economics
JOHN WILLIAM DRAPER

This article argues that neo-classical economics places an
emphasis on short-term gain over precaution,1 and in doing so,
places the lives of a myriad of individual humans—and even the
species itself—at risk. Given the foreseeable risks, if humanity
wants to survive longer, we need to rethink our economic
principles and priorities and the relationship between economics
and law.

Reference Librarian, Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. This is to thank Gideon Parchomovsky, David Skeel, Howard Lesnick,
Matthew Adler, Mitchell Berman, Paul George, Tamara Gaskell, and the late
Harry Reicher for their inspiration, review of earlier drafts, suggestions, and
encouragement. Special thanks go to Perri Hom, Drew Levinson, and Wesley
Dyer of PELR for their edits. All errors are mine.
1. The “precautionary principle” takes the approach of better safe than
sorry. There is scientific and legal literature on the topic. See, e.g., CAROLINE E.
FOSTER, SCIENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS: EXPERT EVIDENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF AND FINALITY (2011);
JOAKIM ZANDER, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE:
COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS (2010) (discusssing the role played by the
precationary principle when addressing issues in the EU); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1003 (2003). The
principle is discussed in writings on environmental law. See, e.g., BÉNÉDICTE
SAGE-FULLER, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HIGH RISK VESSELS (2013); LUCIANO BUTTI, THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: NEITHER ARBITRARY NOR
CAPRICIOUS IF INTERPRETED WITH EQUILIBRIUM (2007); Phillip M. Kannan, The
Precautionary Principle: More than a Cameo Appearance in United States
Environmental Law?, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 409 (2007).
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Neo-classical economic theory is the basis of the current
system of law and economics.2 Professor John Mixon explains:
“The neoclassical model limits its theory of person to two and only
two characteristics: (1) people are rational, and (2) people are selfinterested.”3 Although the model is purported to employ amoral
procedures in an effort to objectively explain and predict human
behavior in a world of limited resources, its focus is on efficiency
in a utilitarian view of resource use with a market ideal of
maximum profit. Sadly, as Mixon notes, “There is no assumption
that people in the market are honest, truthful, fair, or just, except
to the extent they gain some advantage from such behavior.”4
What’s more, the neoclassical model, in predicting human
activity, makes no accommodation for resource conservation,
pollution abatement, population control, or the recognition of any
Earthly limits.5
We build profit-maximization into our law, especially in the
areas of corporations and securities, through statute,6
2. Neo-classical economics is being increasingly absorbed in legal
reasoning. John Mixon, Neoclassical Economics and the Erosion of Middle-Class
Values: An Explanation for Economic Collapse, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 327, 328 (2010). Neo-classical theory is manifested in several ways.
Consider, for example, the shareholder primacy norm. See Jill E. Fisch,
Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J.
CORP. L. 637 (2006).
3. Mixon, supra note 2, at 328.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 333.
6. New Jersey was the first state to relax corporate law in the late
nineteenth century. In 1913, Governor Woodrow Wilson tightened the standards
and “provoked a mass corporate migration to Delaware.” Harwell Wells, The
Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making of Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 263, 282 n.120 (2008). The Delaware chartering and renewal process
was relaxed to the point of providing no oversight. The doors were opened, and
Adolf Berle’s notion of shareholder primacy walked in. See Adolf A. Berle,
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (1931).
Theorists followed: Wealth maximization is the acknowledged purpose of the
firm in the two dominant schools of corporate thought: shareholder primacy and
the managerialist school that defends management discretion. See William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins:
Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 145–46 (2008).
There are examples of required profit-maximization at the federal level. See,
e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring ERISA fiduciaries to discharge their duties
“for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/2

2

DRAPER - FINAL

2016]

4/28/2016 1:47 PM

NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS

159

regulation,7 and case law.8 We embed maximization in order to
support current corporate fiduciary duties and economic growth.
In this way, economics are changing the law. Instead of being
driven by economics, law needs to place limits on the theory and
practice of economics, especially where the use of economic
principles supports the taking of lives in return for proprietary
gain.
I begin with a most brief overview of the various sources of
risk to the human species and its life support system. Then I will
move on to look at how neo-classical economics interacts with
significant risk.
There are two troubling problems with current applications
of neo-classical economics (especially visible in the form of costbenefit analysis): (1) the placing of property rights above, or even
on a par, with all other fundamental rights violates moral and
legal principle and (2) the system of neo-classical economics has
no built-in brake; by valuing only the racing engine of short-term
maximization, the system has no means or mechanism by which
to adequately and consistently slow down to protect the life
support system of the planet. By utilizing this expression of costbenefit analysis, humanity puts itself at risk using neo-classical
economics to kill that life support system9 largely in the name of
material well-being.
What’s more, protection of short-term economic interests crops up in
procedural law. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 1092, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1452–1453,
1711–1715)). This law was sought by big business, and it may serve to insulate
the profits of big business from some of the public’s pain and recourse) as well as
in criminal law (exclusive ownership rights and criminal penalties for violations
thereof). See Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 103(a), 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2012))
(potentially serving to prevent the adoption of new technologies).
7. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1988) (revoked 1994).
8. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)
(discussing that a business corporation is organizaed in a way where its purpose
is primarily to maximize profit of its shareholders); see also Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (noting that
a corporation’s primary role is to maximize the profit of its shareholders); eBay
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 28–30 (Del. Ch. 2010) (same).
9. Scientists say human activity has pushed Earth beyond four of nine
“planetary boundaries.” Joel Achenbach, Scientists: Human Activity Has Pushed
Earth Beyond Four of Nine “Planetary Boundaries,” WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/scientists-humanactivity-has-pushed-earth-beyond-four-of-nine-planetary-
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To be sure, material well-being is important. But more is not
always better. When increased consumption causes humanity to
encounter and exceed the physical limits of the planet, more is
not better. In fact, it can turn out to be deadly.10
Neo-classical economics assumes profit maximization as a
The law protects our
social goal and a property right.11
fundamental rights,12 including property rights. But when we
protect the right to property at the expense of lives, even mere
statistical lives, the world becomes a more deadly and unjust
place.
Most people would agree that it is immoral to take lives in
return for money.13 But that’s what neo-classical economics does;
it places a value on the lives of people and deems those lives
boundaries/2015/01/15/f52b61b6-9b5e-11e4-a7ee-526210d665b4_story.html
[https://perma.cc/M3S6-85SF].
10. “Rioting in response to soaring food prices recently has broken out in
Egypt, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Ethiopia. In Pakistan and Thailand,
army troops have been deployed to deter food theft from fields and warehouses.”
Bob Davis & Douglas Belkin, Food Inflation, Riots Spark Worries for World
Leaders: IMF, World Bank Push for Solutions; Turmoil in Haiti, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 14, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120813134819111573
[http://perma.cc/7UPN-SZQ5]. Other countries “at risk of social upheaval . . .
include Indonesia, Yemen, Ghana, Uzbekistan, and the Philippines. In countries
where buying food itself requires half to three-quarters of a poor person’s
income, there is no margin for survival. Id. (internal quotations omitted). For
another deadly example of exceeding physical limits, consider the effect of
overpopulation in Rwanda. See JARED DIAMOND, Malthus in Africa: Rwanda’s
Genocide, in COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 311–28
(2005).
11. With the ascendancy of the law and economics movement (based on
neo-classical economics), the self-interest of maximization won out even over
non-corporate law. For example, according to Professors Easterbrook and
Fischel, “Managers have no general obligation to avoid violating regulatory
laws, when violations are profitable to the firm.” Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155,
1168 n.36, 1177 n.57 (1982) (“[M]anagers not only may but also should violate
the rules when it is profitable to do so.”).
12. The fundamental rights of “life, liberty, and property” arise in the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
Those fundamental rights may not be taken without due process of law. See
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, Procedural Due Process—Requirement
for Fair Adjudicative Procedure, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 641, 641 (8th ed. 2010).
13. “[M]orally, the killing of people for money is not an acceptable role since
it amounts to murder, which contravenes the principles of universal public
morality.” EDWARD H. SPENCE ET AL., MEDIA, MARKETS, AND MORALS 18 (2011).
Whether or not money is involved, the imperative is simple: “Thou shalt not
kill.” Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17.
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expendable if that value is lower than any conflicting property
right before they die.14 Professors Frank Ackerman and Lisa
Heinzerling do a stellar job of providing concrete examples in
their book15 and earlier article.16
This calculation is more than just a moral problem. Arguably,
such an implementation could be considered a violation of
criminal law as well. Taking money in return for taking lives
certainly has the sound of a criminal violation. The protection of
life is embedded deeply in the roots of Western law’s JudeoThe use by neo-classical economics,
Christian heritage.17
especially cost-benefit analysis (CBA), of the value of statistical
lives (VSL) provides a clear example that flies in the face of these
common notions of justice. Money should not matter more than
life. Neo-classical economics and CBA do that. They are therefore
immoral, if not illegal, and they need to be discontinued and
replaced by a system that honors and protects life.
Neo-classical economics encourages the use of infinite
resources to maximize profits in a short time frame. This winnertake-all approach encourages environmental destruction and
erosion that cumulates in foreseeable risks to the life support
system of the planet.18 Thus, we find that the human problem of
14. Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Thirty-Six
Questions (And Almost as Many Answers), 114 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 181–88
(2014). See Mixon, supra note 2, at 328, for more on the moral position of neoclassical economics.
15. For example, drivers using cell phones are willing to pay more than
people at risk of being killed are willing to pay to avoid that risk. See FRANK
ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 1–2 (2004).
16. For example, using standard cost-benefit analysis, smokers’ lives are
worth less than the savings from reduced expenditures on pensions, housing,
and health care. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless:
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553,
1553–54 (2002).
17. “Thou shalt not kill.” Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17. The imperative
is both legal and moral.
18. One counter argument is that prices of rare resources would go up over
time, such that no depletion would occur. This is wonderful in theory, but the
fact is that people pay more for the rarer, more precious, commodity. The fewer
Sumatran rhino horns there are available in the face of great demand, the more
they are worth, and the more people will pay, even in the face of criminal
sanctions. See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE 79–88 (2002); see also
JORGE H. MALDONADO & ROCIO DEL PILAR MORENO SÁNCHEZ, CENTRO DE
ESTUDIOS SOBRE DESARROLLO ECONÓMICO (CEDE), SERIE DOC. CEDE NO. 2009-

5

DRAPER - FINAL

162

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

4/28/2016 1:47 PM

[Vol. 33

the twenty-first century is, in part, rooted in the neoclassical
economic theory of the late twentieth century and its
implementation in law.
Neo-classical economics provides the decision procedures
commonly used to analyze risk: CBA and discounting. Those
procedures have deficiencies, and those deficiencies are shared
with neo-classical economics and at least to a degree, its greater
theory, utilitarianism.
We analyze and cope with risks through views that have long
been developed. Here, I will compare two of the three main views
of risk: the objective view and the moral view.19
The objective view is statistical or quantitative. It
dispassionately attempts to employ a unitary metric to drive a
mechanical CBA.20 The unitary metric fails in our biological
world.21 It results in precise numbers that say nothing about the
moral choices under consideration.22
22, DOES SCARCITY EXACERBATE THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS? EVIDENCE FROM
FISHERS’ EXPERIMENTAL RESPONSES 5–9 (2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502899
[https://perma.cc/SYM5-5ZE9] (discussing the effect of differences in source
stock on the levels of extraction). See also BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF
CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 95 (2004), for more on competition for inherently
scarce goods.
19. The third, the subjective view, is largely a sociological theory. I will not
discuss the subjective view of risk which includes sociological risk analysis. It
considers an increasing feeling of underlying fear in the context of the world risk
society, see ULRICH BECK, WORLD RISK SOCIETY 19–47 (1999), but its focus on
subjectivity is not well suited to displace the claims of the objective view.
20. “Benefit and burden are measured by inquiring into the preferences, as
expressed in dollars, of those affected by the risk impositions at issue.” Gregory
C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND.
L. REV. 653, 681 (2003).
21. From a biological perspective, selection theory that takes account of
both altruism and selfishness is known as multilevel selection theory. Arriving
at a unitary metric is likely to be impossible in the absence of a single statistical
method of accounting. According to biologists David Sloan Wilson and Edward
O. Wilson, “there is no single statistical method that captures all aspects of
multilevel selection theory.” See David Sloan Wilson & Edward O. Wilson,
Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology, 82 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 327,
337 (2007). When one considers altruism toward one’s loved ones and friends,
it’s easy to envision at least some altruistic behavior.
22. Keating, supra note 20, at 681.
The unrestricted use of subjective preference (whether or not it is
expressed in dollars) is objectionable because it compares harms—
death and inconvenience, for example—which are not comparable
morally speaking, and permits a sufficient quantity of trivial benefit
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Instead, in this article, I will rely on a third view of risk, the
moral view. The morality of protecting lives should prevail over
claims of right to property or prosperity.
The deeper problem is our response to risk. This article
argues that neo-classical economics should be displaced by theory
and practice that do a better job of protecting all of us from
significant risk. Humanity should move to eventually ban the use
of unrestricted neo-classical economics, including cost-benefit
analysis, in cases of significant risk as well as for insignificant
risks that cumulate or interact to cause significant risk.
I.

FORESEEABILITY OF CATASTROPHE

Generally, we do not want to be negligent. When a risk is
foreseeable, we tend to avoid negligence by planning ahead or by
using some kind of risk analysis. The law of negligence protects
defendants when the result is not foreseeable.23 One cannot be
found negligent if the risk was not foreseeable. However, if and
when one can foresee the risk, and the risk to life, liberty, or
property is significant, a finding of negligence is possible.
As we will see in the moral view of risk, we should not harm
others, either through intent or through negligence.
Foreseeability of catastrophe should be enough to justify having a
discussion about taking a new course. The ability to talk about
catastrophe from a cause and effect standpoint would seem to be
enough to justify discussion, especially in the face of man-made
irreversible catastrophe. Unfortunately, studies of man-made risk
show increasing probabilities of catastrophe on many fronts. How
should we think about this combination of problems?
We do not think about this combination of problems in order
to prove negligence. The required decision pertains to how
humanity will avoid its own negligence, especially that which
may lead to mass death.
We, as a species, need a healthy respect for certain types of
catastrophe. These would not be far-fetched concepts; the
to justify some irreparable injury. Harms must be comparable in
urgency and in the benefit or injury they work on the lives of those
they affect before they may be traded against one another.
Id.
23. See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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catastrophe must be at least foreseeable. Unfortunately, many
significant risks to the human species are more than foreseeable.
In many instances, we already see some of their effects.
II. FORESEEABLE CAUSES OF CATASTROPHE
Foreseeable catastrophes are well-documented in Jared
Diamond’s list of Twelve Causes of Human Collapse and in the
computer runs described in Limits to Growth: The 30-Year
Update (LTG30),24 which demonstrate the need for humanity to
reach sustainable levels of population, consumption, and
pollution.
When we consider collapse—and the details of collapse—we
find a detailed and supported list of causes in Jared Diamond’s
Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. Diamond’s
book constitutes a catalogue of potential scenarios, all based
largely on historical and archaeological record.
We should look at the human situation another way as well.
The latest in-depth quantitative overview of earthly limits,
environmental overshoot, and consequent significant risk is found
in LTG30. Although it is past time for replacement by a new
edition,25 the book has analytic value.
Through the LTG30 authors’ eyes, we see that each risk is
dynamic and also part of a larger dynamic. We can quickly find
ourselves engaging in complex system theory. There are many
moving parts. We need to slow down and figure out what we’re
doing—before we break something, run into a wall, or run off a
cliff.
Positive feedback loops enhance the possibility that small
changes in initial conditions can have huge effects as events
develop.26 Professor of cliodynamics,27 Peter Turchin, explains:

24. DONELLA MEADOWS ET AL., LIMITS TO GROWTH: THE 30-YEAR UPDATE
(2004).
25. A 2012 edition was planned. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at xxii.
26. See S.H. Schneider, The Changing Climate, SCI. AM., Sept. 1989, at 73,
for a scenario with strong positive feedback.
27. See PETER TURCHIN, WAR AND PEACE AND WAR: THE RISE AND FALL OF
EMPIRES 10–11 (2007), for a description of cliodynamics, “the study of processes
that change with time.”
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[N]onlinear interactions between various processes can produce
internally driven irregular behavior—mathematical chaos.
Mathematicians have proven that a dynamical system affected by
two sources of cyclic behaviors will, under certain conditions,
behave chaotically—in an erratic manner that looks random but
in reality is completely internally generated.28

A system’s complexity can force it to evolve to increasingly
complex states that are increasingly unstable—until the
equivalent of an avalanche occurs. All it takes is one significant
discontinuity. Consider the world economy.29 Or one can argue
that human civilization itself is an unstable system all the more
subject to avalanche, especially as humanity is deep in
environmental overshoot. We will examine overshoot shortly.
We don’t know exactly where we are in relationship to the
edge of the cliff or to some significant crash. Given the risks,
enumerated just ahead, it seems reasonable to believe that we
should slow down, steady ourselves, and find out. Even if we don’t
find out clearly, it seems rational to take some precaution. Here is
what humanity is up against.
A. Diamond’s Twelve Causes of Human Collapse
Toward the end of Collapse, Jared Diamond distills the dozen
most serious environmental problems facing past and present
societies. They fall into four categories: (1) the destruction or loss
of natural resources, (2) natural resource ceilings, (3) harmful
things we produce or move around, and (4) human population.
Let’s briefly review them. As can be seen in LTG30 with the
World3 model, the problems can combine in any number of ways
to bring about collapse.
First, loss of resources can occur in many ways. Humanity is
destroying natural habitats,30 destroying wild food sources,31
28. Id. at 286.
29. “The world’s economy is a soft-paste porcelain vase set on a wobbly
plant stand in the heart of an active earthquake zone.” Jim McTague, Could Fed
Miscalculations Lead to $10,000 Gold?, BARRON’S (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB5000142405311190481960457764361297862
2748 [http://perma.cc/8LE3-J6EY].
30. See JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR
SUCCEED 487–88 (2005). This includes deforestation (a major factor in collapses
of past societies), as well as destruction of wetlands, the ocean bottom, and reefs.
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losing biodiversity,32 and causing soil damage and erosion.33
Secondly, in regard to resource ceilings or limits,34 there is a
ceiling or limit on the amount of energy sources, particularly
fossil fuels, available in the world.35 There is also a limit or
ceiling on fresh water utilization.36
And there is the
photosynthetic ceiling, something that Professor Diamond says
has become serious only recently. By the middle of the twentyfirst century, most of the available sunlight will be used by
For example, at least 30 percent of coral reefs worldwide were in critical
condition in 1997, and 95 percent of those checked around the world showed
degradation and species loss. Don Hinrichson, Coral Reefs in Crisis, 47
BIOSCIENCE 554, 554 (1997). With more trawlers and warmer seas in the last 19
years, is the situation is unlikely to have improved.
31. See DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 488.
32. See id. at 488–89. “A significant fraction of wild species, populations,
and genetic biodiversity has already been lost, and at present rates a large
fraction of what remains will be lost within the next half-century.” Id. at 488.
The costs of wild species extinction and population loss are many. The species
are irreplaceable. Their loss may bring harmful consequences, for instance, by
breaking or interfering with the food chain for other species—or our food chain!
“Elimination of lots of lousy little species regularly causes big harmful
consequences for humans, just as does randomly knocking out many of the lousy
little rivets holding together an airplane.” Id. at 489. At least in an airplane, the
rivets are not connected to each other. In ecosystems, if one species goes, it may
take others in a chain reaction.
33. See id. at 489–90. “Soils of farmlands used for growing crops are being
carried away by water and wind erosion at rates between 10 and 40 times the
rates of soil formation, and between 500 and 10,000 times soil erosion rates on
forested land.” Id. at 489. On top of erosion, salinization, acidification, and
alkalinization have severely damaged somewhere between 20 and 80 percent of
the world’s farmland. See id. at 489–90.
34. To Dana Meadows and the other authors of Limits to Growth, ceilings
are called limits. In their view, limits can be exceeded, but only for a brief period
of time called overshoot. If usage is not then carefully reduced, collapse occurs.
In the language of Jared Diamond, limits are known as ceilings. Id. at 490.
Diamond does not have the luxury of a computer program to prove the details of
the collision with ceilings. He employs historical cause and effect.
35. See id. at 490. With increasing extraction, our current reserves of our
most valuable fossil fuels will last only a few more decades. Then the fuels will
be the dirtier, the more expensive to extract, with increasing extraction,
processing, and environmental costs for each remaining source. Id. We will not
be the first to face an energy limit. Norse Greenland and Easter Island had their
energy limits. What wood they had for cooking and heat was used up, and the
result contributed to their collapse.
36. See id. We face the depletion of aquifers in the U.S. southwest, in
China, in the middle east, and in other places all over the world. Also consider
the increasing costs of the increasing need for desalinization. Already, more
than a billion of us lack access to safe, reliable drinking water. Id.
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humans and little will be left over for forests or other plant
species.37 Third, there are the harmful things we produce or
move around: toxic chemicals, alien or invasive species, and
atmospheric gases. We have insecticides, pesticides, herbicides,
PCBs, mercury, and other toxins that we can absorb through our
skin, our food, our water, or merely through the air.38
Introduced, alien or invasive species devastate native species that
have developed no tolerance or defense mechanisms for
protection.39 And atmospheric gases play a role in global climate
change contributing at the very least to polar ice melt and a
projected rise in sea levels.40 Finally, the last two serious
environmental problems facing past and present societies involve
population. Consider the vast human population41 and its
expanding footprint.42
Our footprint is enormous. As it is, the Earth cannot support
humanity, and our consumption is overshooting our
environmental resources. The developed First World consumes
and wastes thirty-two times more per capita than does the Third
37. See id. at 491.
38. Id. at 491–92. Prior societies have not faced the challenges of toxic
chemicals. The results include birth defects, mental retardation, a drop in our
sperm counts, and 130,000 air pollution deaths annually in the United States
alone. Even the worst pollution in the United States is mild compared to that of
China, the former Soviet Union, and many Third World mining sites. Id. at 492.
39. See id. at 491–92. An invasive species can have a major impact on a
society. For instance, stowaway rats contributed to the destruction of Easter
Island’s palms by eating the seeds. TERRY HUNT & CARL LIPO, UNRAVELING THE
MYSTERY OF EASTER ISLAND: THE STATUES THAT WALKED 29–31 (2011). “There are
by now literally hundreds of cases in which alien species have caused one-time
or annually recurring damages of hundreds of millions of dollars or even billions
of dollars.” DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 492.
40. See DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 493. This, too, is a challenge not faced
by prior societies. The gases consist of former refrigerator coolant, carbon
dioxide (mostly from burning fuels), and methane (from herds of sheep and
cattle). As a result, global warming and sea level rise occur. “The areas thereby
threatened include much of the Netherlands, Bangladesh, and the seaboard of
the eastern U.S., many low-lying Pacific islands, the deltas of the Nile and
Mekong Rivers, and coastal and riverbank cities of the U.K. (e.g., London),
India, Japan, and the Philippines.” Id.
41. See id. at 494. There are over seven billion of us on this cozy planet, and
a powerful momentum is carrying the number upward. Because a
disproportionate percentage of the population is young, even with the immediate
implementation of a two-child policy, Earth’s population will increase for the
next seventy years. Id.
42. See id. at 494–96.
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World, but our developing-world kin are moving to increase their
footprint and impact. If they were to succeed, current
consumption and waste would be surpassed twelve-fold.43 If
China alone succeeded, the footprint would double.44
If China fully modernizes, it will place a strain on the planet
that is a threat to all of us. They can’t have the same quality of
life unless we all work to change our technology and standards.
It’s not just China. And it’s not just the Third World. We’re all in
this together.
First World governments do not acknowledge that it is
impossible for the Third World population to reach current First
World standards.45 Even now the First World cannot maintain
its standards due to resource depletion. To attempt to bring
everyone up to those standards is not only impossible but
downright dangerous. Diamond asks, “What will happen when it
finally dawns on all those people in the Third World that current
First World standards are unreachable for them, and that the
First World refuses to abandon those standards for itself?”46
That dawning is already taking place.47 Either they manage to
move here, or, when they stay there, we look like hypocrites.
Jared Diamond hits the nail when he explains the ultimate
conundrum of economic development: “[T]he cruelest trade-off
that we shall have to resolve: encouraging and helping all people
to achieve a higher standard of living, without thereby
43. The number is twelve-fold rather than thirty-two-fold probably because
there are already First World inhabitants with high-impact lifestyles.
44. Id. at 495
45. Ted
Trainer,
Our
Unsustainable
Society;
Basic
Causes,
Interconnections, and Solutions, in THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY; PREVENTING
MASS DEATH AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 83, 90 (Michael N.
Dobkowski & Isidor Wallimann eds., 1998).
Above all, the limits-to-growth analysis makes clear that the
conventional conception of development is totally mistaken about
goals. It is not possible for all Third World people to rise to the living
standards of the rich countries. Yet, that goal is still taken for
granted in almost all official development theory and practice.
Id.
46. DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 496.
47. See, e.g., Drew Hinshaw, Allure of Wealth Drives Deadly Trek: Young
Men in Senegal Join Migrant Wave Despite Growing Prosperity at Home, WALL
ST. J. (June 12, 2015 12:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/young-men-insenegal-join-migrant-wave-despite-growing-prosperity-at-home-1434127244
[http://perma.cc/LVH6-NYZM].
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undermining that standard through overstressing global
resources.”48 Human population growth affects and exacerbates
all the other problems.
We are currently on a non-sustainable course. Any one of the
twelve problems Diamond enumerates could limit our lifestyle, to
say the least, within the next fifty years: “The single most
important problem is our misguided focus on identifying our
single most important problem. . . . [T]hey all interact with each
other. If we solved 11 of the problems, but not the 12th, we would
still be in trouble, whichever was the problem that remained
unsolved.”49 Diamond is right. We must solve them all. We don’t
have twelve single problems. They are connected, and some
reinforce others.
B. LTG30’s Three Basic Causes of Human Failure
The three basic causes of human failure are too much
consumption, too much pollution, and too much population.50 We,
especially those of us in the First World, consume much more
than we need—or than the planet can support. Our systems of
subsidies encourage the consumption,51 and calls for austerity
meet with protest.52 So many of us demand too much from such a
small and over-run planet.
48. DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 496. Somehow, the idea of success must
come to involve less consumption and less risk.
49. Id. at 498.
50. Id. at 487–96; MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 238–44. Harvard’s
Pulitzer Prize-winning scientist, Edward O. Wilson explains the challenge of the
current human situation:
The race is now on between the technoscientific forces that are
destroying the living environment and those that can be harnessed
to save it. We are inside a bottleneck of overpopulation and wasteful
consumption. If the race is won, humanity can emerge in far better
condition than when it entered, and with most of the diversity of life
intact.
WILSON, supra note 18, at xxiii.
51. See David P. Coady et al., How Large Are Global Energy Subsidies? 12
(Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 15/105, 2015), https://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15105.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA25-TL6H].
52. “[Greeks] have rebelled against the crushing austerity measures that
Europe has demanded in exchange for bailing out the indebted government.”
Michael Birnbaum, Greece Fails to Make Key IMF Debt Payment, WASH. POST,
(June 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/europeanleaders-seek-last-ditch-offer-to-bring-greece-from-brink-of-
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1. Consumption
Humanity’s ecological footprint is unsustainable. As Edward
O. Wilson warns, we ought to worry about permanent
environmental damage, wherever it is:
Earth, unlike the other solar planets, is not in physical
equilibrium. It depends on its living shell to create the special
conditions on which life is sustainable. The soil, water, and
atmosphere of its surface have evolved over hundreds of millions
of years to their present condition by the activity of the
biosphere, a stupendously complex layer of living creatures
whose activities are locked together in precise but tenuous global
cycles of energy and transformed organic matter. The biosphere
creates our special world anew every day, every minute, and
holds it in a unique, shimmering physical disequilibrium. On
that disequilibrium the human species is in total thrall. When we
alter the biosphere in any direction, we move the environment
away from the delicate dance of biology. When we destroy
ecosystems and extinguish species, we degrade the greatest
heritage this planet has to offer and thereby threaten our own
existence.53

Wilson argues that our environmental footprint is too large
and that the risk is great. The typical economist wants
quantitative data proving that there is a statistically significant
risk, more than a background risk, of collapse or extinction soon.
For such quantitative data, let us look at the position of some
well-known systems dynamics scholars. The phenomenon of
limits to growth was explored originally from 1970 to 1972 in the
System Dynamics Group of the Sloan School of Management at
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Initially, the study
led to the publication of Donella Meadows et al., The Limits to
Growth (1972), with twelve internally consistent scenarios of
world development reaching from 1900 to 2100, all based on
computer modeling.54 In 1972, there was hope for a gradual

default/2015/06/30/960aded8-1ea2-11e5-a135-935065bc30d0_story.html
[https://perma.cc/T5ZP-HXZ3].
53. WILSON, supra note 18, at 39.
54. See generally Graham Turner, A Comparison of the Limits to Growth
with Thirty Years of Reality, 18 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 397 (2008), for a nice
description of that modeling.
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downward adjustment in humanity’s footprint. The 1992 update,
with a slightly updated computer model (World3), yielded the
second edition, Donella Meadows et al., Beyond the Limits. This
update contained one major new finding: humanity had already
overshot the limits of Earth’s carrying capacity.55
More years passed, and a third edition was published.56 For
more details of the assumptions and the workings of World3, it is
best to read the work itself, especially the Authors’ Preface to
LTG30.
The numbers help us better understand the size of our
ecological footprint, its trajectory, and the implications for the
not-so-distant future, a future that is racing to meet us with
increasing speed:57
55. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at ix-xiii. The idea of planetary
overshoot was introduced in the 1987 report of the U.N.-sanctioned Brundtland
Commission, Our Common Future, that:
popularized the idea of sustainability and a narrower concept,
sustainable development . . . . [T]he report described the extent of
world poverty and global environmental calamity and articulated,
for the first time, sustainability’s “Three Es”—environment,
economics and social equity—arguing how all three realms must be
optimized, and how, over the long term, a just and truly sustainable
world cannot have one without the other.
Robert Eagan, Sense & Sustainability, 133 LIBR. J. 40, 40 (2008).
56. In addition to updating the earlier works, the authors had other
purposes behind the preparation of Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update.
Among other reasons, they wished to:

stress that humanity is in overshoot and that the resulting
damage and suffering can be greatly reduced through wise
policy;

offer data and analysis to contradict prevailing political
pronouncements that humanity is on the correct path for its
twenty-first century;

inspire the world’s citizens to think about the long-term
consequences of their actions and choices—and muster their
political support for actions that would reduce the damage from
overshoot . . . .
MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at xix.
57. Humanity’s increasing speed—and the effects thereof—have been well
known for some time:
We live in a world of accelerating change. The rate of change
produces pressure upon available procedures of adjustment. A single
basic statistical projection conveys some sense of the magnitude of
change in our world: In the 30 years from 1970 to the year 2000
there will be more construction than came to pass from 3000 bc to
date. The endangered-planet crisis in part arises because our
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For those who can respect numbers, we can report that the
highly aggregated scenarios of World3 still appear, after 30
years, to be surprisingly accurate. The world in the year 2000
had the same number of people (about 6 billion—up from 3.9
billion in 1972) that we projected in the 1972 standard run of
World3. Furthermore, that scenario showed a growth in global
food production (from 1.8 billion tons of grain equivalent per year
in 1972 to 3 billion in 2000) that matches history quite well. Does
this correspondence with history prove that our model was true?
No, of course not. But it does indicate that World3 was not totally
absurd; its assumptions and our conclusions still warrant
consideration today.58

Certainly, World3 population projections were not absurd.
And neither were the other projections. For the fortieth
anniversary of the 1972 Limits to Growth, Australian Physicist
Graham Turner did a comparison of the 1972 limits to growth
projections with forty years of real world data, including
population,59 services per capita,60 food per capita,61 industrial
output per capita,62 non-renewable resources,63 and persistent
pollution.64 Using the World3 model as a predictive validation
technique,65 Turner found that humanity remains on track for
disaster. It’s getting closer.66 Clearly, we have reached the point
of foreseeability.
technological abilities are evolving so much more rapidly than are
our abilities to solve social and political problems. Tensions have
always resulted from the inability of political man to cope with the
changes wrought by technological man, but these inabilities now
threaten irreversible disaster on a planetary scale.
RICHARD A. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR
HUMAN SURVIVAL 67 (1971) (internal quotations omitted).
58. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at xviii.
59. Graham Turner, On the Cusp of Global Collapse? Updated Comparison
of the Limits to Growth with Historical Data, 21 GAIA 116, 116–24 (2012).
60. Id. at 119.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 120.
64. Id. at 121.
65. Turner, supra note 59, at 121.
66. Id. at 123.
[T]he alignment of data trends with the model’s dynamics indicates
that the early stages of collapse could occur within a decade, or
might even be underway. This suggests, from a rational risk-based
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2. Population
In light of all the other factors, it is easy to see that getting a
handle on the population problem is only the beginning. Here is
World3’s core question: How may the expanding global population
and material economy interact with and adapt to the earth’s
limited carrying capacity over the coming decades?
To be more specific, the carrying capacity is a limit. Any
population that grows past its carrying capacity, overshooting the
limit, will not long sustain itself. And while any population is
above the carrying capacity, it will deteriorate the support
capacity of the system it depends upon. If regeneration of the
environment is possible, the deterioration will be temporary. If
regeneration is not possible, or if it takes place only over
centuries, the deterioration will be effectively permanent. 67

When we consider Easter Island, especially in light of its
extinctions,68 we can see that it represents an example of such
effectively permanent deterioration. The island’s carrying
capacity has been eroded.
There are four ways a society can approach its carrying
capacity. Two of them involve staying beneath the limits. It is
already too late for the first two options.69 We are now facing the
LTG30’s choice between option three and option four:
The third possibility for a growing society is to overshoot its
carrying capacity without doing massive and permanent damage.
In that case the ecological footprint would oscillate around the
limit before leveling off. This behavior . . . is called damped
oscillation. The fourth possibility is to overshoot the limits, with
perspective, that planning for a collapsing global system could be
even more important than trying to avoid collapse.
Id.
67. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 137.
68. DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 102–09.
69. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 137.
First it can grow without interruption, as long as its limits are far
away or are growing faster than the population. Second, it can level
off smoothly below the carrying capacity, in a behavior that
ecologists call logistic, or S-shaped, or sigmoid growth . . . .Neither of
these options is any longer available to global society, because it is
already above its sustainable limits.
Id.
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severe and permanent damage to the resource base. If that were
to occur, the population and the economy would be forced to
decline rapidly to achieve a new balance with the recently
reduced carrying capacity at a much lower level. We use the
phrase overshoot and collapse to designate this option . . . .70

When we are led to consider collapse—and the details of
collapse—we see the tie-in to Jared Diamond’s Collapse: How
Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. Diamond’s book contains a
catalogue of potential scenarios, and the latest full quantitative
overview is found in LTG30, as updated by Graham Turner.71
The quantitatively-oriented economist is likely to want
numbers. There are plenty of quantitative references that could
be discussed in a longer work. However, the interaction of the
numbers is not simple. As you might imagine, it takes a computer
program to draw them all in and consider them all at once. Many
of the numbers and calculations are implicit in the structure of
the World3 model.72 The model’s purpose, structure, its growth
and erosion processes, limits, delays and feedback loops are best
described in LTG30.73 Read LTG30. For now, let’s get some idea
of what we might find there.

70. Id. at 137–38.
71. See GRAHAM TURNER, MELBOURNE SUSTAINABLE SOC’Y INST., RESEARCH
PAPER NO. 4, IS GLOBAL COLLAPSE IMMINENT? AN UPDATED COMPARISON OF THE
LIMITS TO GROWTH WITH HISTORICAL DATA 4–5 (Lauren Rickards ed., 2014),
http://sustainable-dev.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/docs/MSSIResearchPaper-4_Turner_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/AM7L-J3Y4] [hereinafter
MSSI RESEARCH PAPER]; Turner, supra note 59, at 116–24 (2012); Graham
Turner, A Comparison of the Limits to Growth with Thirty Years of Reality, 18
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 397, 401–02 (2008).
72. Other models and simulations have been attempted. See, e.g., Akira
Onishi, A New Frontier Science of Economics: Global Model Simulation (Ctr. for
Glob. Modeling, Found. for Fusion of Sci. & Tech., Working Paper, 2008),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1198943 [http://perma.cc/ND4T-TJYQ]. Onishi’s model
appears to be economic in nature. If a model is based solely on economics and
does not include natural limits, its predictions will be of limited value. It is
worth noting that Professor Onishi believes that one needs to use a “cosmic
mind” of “human solidarity” to be successful at thinking about humanity’s
future. Id. at pt. 6(9); see also AKIRA ONISHI, GLOBAL MODEL SIMULATION: A
FRONTIER OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (2010).
73. See MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 129–62, 285–93.
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3. Overshoot and Collapse
The process of exceeding limits, going into the red, is called
overshoot, which “means to go too far, to go beyond limits
accidentally—without intention.”74
Overshoot can describe
sliding past a stop sign on an icy road, drinking too much alcohol
the night before the morning after, building too many fishing
boats for the fish population to sustain, or creating too many
chlorinated chemicals for the upper atmosphere to accommodate,
thereby depleting the ozone layer for decades, until it can recover.
Overshoot beyond the limits is a reality. We have been living
it since the early 1990s.75 Humanity is going deeper and deeper
into trouble. We need to make progress on both fronts, population
and impact per person, in order to increase our chances of
survival. We were twenty percent past Earth’s sustainable
carrying capacity in 2002, and our consumption continues to
increase.76 We are not paying attention to the signs and the
studies. We do not have another 30 years to dither.77 We must
work immediately to begin to change the way we live.78 We need

74. Id. at 1.
75. As the authors of LTG30 observe:
It now appears that the global per capita grain production peaked in
the mid-1980s. The prospects for significant growth in the harvest of
marine fish are gone. The costs of natural disasters are increasing,
and there is growing intensity, even conflict, in efforts to allocate
fresh water resources and fossil fuels among competing demands.
The United States and other major nations continue to increase their
greenhouse gas emissions even though scientific consensus and
meteorological data both suggest that the global climate is being
altered by human activity. There are already persistent economic
declines in many localities and regions. Fifty-four nations, with 12
percent of the world population, experienced declines in per capita
GDP for more than a decade during the period from 1990 to 2001.
MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at xiv.
76. See id. at xiv (citing Mathis Wackernagel et al., Tracking the Ecological
Overshoot of the Human Economy, 99 PROC. ACAD. SCI. 9266–71 (2002)); MSSI
RESEARCH PAPER, supra note 71, at 6–8.
77. “[T]o accommodate sustainably the anticipated increase in population
and economic output of the next four decades, we would need six to twelve
additional planets.” MATHIS WACKERNAGEL & WILLIAM REES, OUR ECOLOGICAL
FOOTPRINT: REDUCING HUMAN IMPACT ON THE EARTH 91 (1996). Two of those four
decades are gone, humanity has made no major steps toward sustainability or
population control, and no additional livable planets are in sight.
78. BECK, supra note 19, at 10–11.
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to study and ask new questions. We need to care enough to
discuss and attempt to agree soon on any implementational goals
to reach sustainability.79
The local specifics pertaining to exceeding our footprint are
not limited to economic decline. Donella Meadows et al. note
examples of how quality of life can be adversely affected at the
local level.80 These quality of life matters are not limited to only
some of us. They affect all of us, including the rich. It also
appears that the problems are increasing at an increasing rate.
Welcome to overshoot.

People are better adapted to the future than are social institutions
and their representatives. The decline of values which cultural
pessimists are so fond of decrying is in fact opening up the possibility
of an escape from the “bigger, more, better” creed, in a period that is
living beyond its means both ecologically and economically. Whereas,
in the old system of values, the self always had to be subordinated to
patterns of the collective, the new orientations towards the “we” are
creating something like a cooperative or altruist individualism.
Thinking of oneself and living for others – once considered by
definition contradictory – are revealed as internally and
substantially connected with each other.
Id.
Changing the way we live means slowing down, not speeding up. The
answer does not lie in hurrying to build new coal-fired power plants in Texas
ahead of increased restrictions, see Rebecca Smith, Burning Debate: As
Emissions Restrictions Loom, Texas Utility Bets Big on Coal: Planned TXU
Plants Raise Global-Warming Concerns, WALL STREET J. (July 21, 2006),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115344549183413209 [perma.cc/26RP-Z4P3], any
more than it does in building a new coal-fired power plant weekly in China, see
Terence Chea, Asia, Particularly China, Shares Pollution with the U.S. – The
Impact of Breakneck Economic Growth Is Being Felt Across the Pacific, PHILA.
INQUIRER, July 30, 2006, at A3.
79. See MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at xv.
80. Id. at 123.
Jakarta emits more air pollution than human lungs can bear. The
forests of the Philippines are nearly gone. The soils of Haiti have
been worn down in places to bare rock. The cod fisheries off
Newfoundland have been closed. Parisians have to endure summer
days of reduced speed limits to cut down pollution from their fuming
cars. Several European countries saw thousands die prematurely as
the summer of 2003 set new records for high temperatures. The
chemical load in the Rhine was for many years so high that dredged
silt from Dutch harbors now has to be treated as hazardous waste.
Skiers visiting Oslo in the winter of 2001 found hardly any useful
snow.
Id.
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However, the authors of LTG30 also view overshoot from a
practical, societal, standpoint. They see overshoot and subsequent
decline as a failure to prepare for the future:
Welfare loss will occur, for example, when there is no ready
replacement for dwindling reserves of oil, for scarcer wild fish,
and for expensive tropical woods, once these resources start to
deplete. The problem is worse when the resource base is erodible
and gets destroyed during overshoot. Then society might
experience collapse.81

The authors give an example of collapse in a different
context. When the dot-com bubble burst in 2000, it took three
years for the air to come out of the stock market. The erodible
resource was investor confidence. When it eroded sufficiently, the
market collapsed.82
Environmental overshoot is the result of a combination of
factors. The authors of LTG30 explain the three causes of
overshoot: (1) growth or acceleration, (2) “some form of limit or
barrier, beyond which the moving system may not safely go,” and
(3) a “delay or mistake in the perceptions and the responses that
strive to keep the system within its limits.”83 All three are
“necessary and sufficient to produce an overshoot.”84 Ultimately,
it appears that humanity will need to control its own speed and
use sensors to keep us from exceeding earthly limits, and employ
systems of clear signals and responses designed to reduce delays.
Our survival depends not only on the timing of our response
to signals, but also on the nature of the actions we take in
response to those signals. If our response is successful, then after
overshoot we get oscillation rather than collapse. In Norway, the
government bought up and retired fishing boats until the fish
stocks could regenerate.85 In New England, sawmills were
shuttered after too many were built for sustainability and the
forests were depleted.86 These are local examples of adjustment
and recovery.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at xxi.
See id.
Id. at 1.
Id.
MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 163.
Id.
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Fifteenth-century Norse Greenland is an example of collapse
when regeneration does not take place in the face of overshoot.87
According to the authors of LTG30, if the damage is irreversible,
if there is collapse, it stands to be catastrophic:
Nothing can bring back an extinct species. Fossil fuels are
permanently destroyed in the very act of using them. Some
pollutants, such as radioactive materials, can’t be rendered
harmless by any natural mechanism. If the climate is
significantly altered, geological data suggest that temperature
and precipitation patterns probably will not return to normal
within a time period meaningful to human society. Even
renewable resources and pollution absorption processes can be
permanently destroyed by prolonged or systematic misuse. When
tropical forests are cut down in ways that preclude their
regrowth, when the sea infiltrates fresh water aquifers with salt,
when soils wash away leaving only bedrock, when a soil’s acidity
is changed sufficiently to flush out the heavy metals it has stored,
then the earth’s carrying capacity is diminished permanently, or
at least for a period that appears permanent to human beings. 88

Overshoot and then collapse is a possibility. Combined with
nonlinearities (thresholds beyond which a system’s behavior
suddenly changes), erosion, a stress that multiplies itself if it is
not quickly remedied, converts overshoot to collapse.89 Once past
the critical threshold, erosion loops turn overshoot and oscillation
into overshoot and collapse.90
Although erosion loops are
normally dormant, when overshoot occurs without correction, the
loops can lead overshoot into a downhill spiral. For example,
overgrazed grasslands can erode, and erosion can lead to
desertification and the complete loss of land fertility.91
4. Erosion Loops and Pollution
There are several erosion loops in the World3 model. For
example, when people are hungry, they work the land harder,
87. See DIAMOND, supra note 30, at 248–52.
88. MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 163–64.
89. See id. at 164–67.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 165. Consider the land in much of the Middle East, including the
cradle of civilization.
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depleting it of its nutrients in the short run in an effort to
produce more food.92 The result is lower food production from
increasingly diminished soil fertility. Another example occurs in a
weakening economy, when services per capita decline. When
reductions in family planning services occur, the population
increases, which brings further decline in services per capita.
There are also erosion loops that can adversely affect the
industrial capital plant and pollution absorption mechanisms.93
One example of an erosion loop in a pollution absorption
mechanism is illustrative. Air pollutants can weaken or kill
forests. In doing so, they diminish a sink for carbon dioxide, a
greenhouse gas.94
Some erosion loops are not included in World3. Social erosion
is one example. When elites use their power and repression to
grab wealth, inequality can lead the middle classes to frustration
and anger. If the elites respond by hiring guards and using
additional force, the spiral can lead to revolution and social
breakdown.
Erosion loops are now beginning to get serious public
attention. As the authors of LTG30 report, “When we first
published our results in 1972, the majority of people thought
human disruption of natural processes on a global scale was
inconceivable. Now it is the subject of newspaper headlines, the
focus of scientific meetings, and the object of international
negotiations.”95
We are now beginning to see some of these erosion loops in
action, as they help us increase our speed toward collapse. For
example, the southern ocean CO2 sink is not only full, between
1981 and 2004 it has weakened or eroded, releasing carbon
dioxide, apparently as a result of a warming world. And the
effects of that erosion help to further reduce the sink’s absorption
capabilities.96 We need to avoid more environmental overshoot
and erosion.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 164.
Id. at 165.
MEADOWS ET AL., supra note 24, at 166.
See id. at 166–67.
Id. at 167.
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C. More than Mere Foreseeability
Sadly, we cannot grow our way out of overshoot. Our species
has gone too far. Quickening our pace will not help when we need
to slow down. The situation seems sufficiently dire that we should
consider using law to make positive changes soon. First, though,
we need to disengage the law that is making matters worse. And
we need to do it soon.
Both science and social science predict mass death.97 We are
far beyond the point of foreseeability. Even the Pope is most
eloquent with the details of similar concerns.98 As the sciences
and religion99 see the same problem, it’s time to consider law’s
alignment with that vision.
To do that, we will need to think about how law currently
treats risk. We will find that law does not treat risk with respect
by protecting life. Instead, we will discover that law attempts to
treat risk as a short-term money-making opportunity.
III. HOW HUMANITY TREATS RISK
Aside from science, there is another context for the protection
of humanity. It is the manner in which we treat risk. Some of

97. The business as usual (BAU) approach is on track for disaster in about
2030. See MSSI RESEARCH PAPER, supra note 71, at 7; see also MARTIN J. REES,
OUR FINAL HOUR: A SCIENTIST’S WARNING: HOW TERROR, ERROR, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER THREATEN HUMANKIND’S FUTURE IN THIS CENTURY—ON
EARTH AND BEYOND 7–8 (2003) (“I think the odds are no better than fifty-fifty
that our present civilisation on Earth will survive to the end of the present
century.”). We are entering what “may well be the most destructive of the
possible scenarios.” John B. Cobb, Jr., The Threat to the Underclass, in THE
COMING AGE OF SCARCITY, supra note 45, at 25, 26.
98. See Francis, Encyclical Letter Laudato Si’ 16–43 (May 24, 2015),
http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papafrancesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html [https://perma.cc/5YPJ-4KYT]
99. See Justin Gillis, For Faithful, Social Justice Goals Demand Action on
Environment, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2015, at A1; David O’Reilly, Rabbis Issue a
Letter on the Environment, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 15, 2015),
http://articles.philly.com/2015-06-15/news/63415018_1_climate-change-tikkunpope-francis [https://perma.cc/SHN5-WVV6]; Rabbi Arthur Waskow et al., A
Rabbinic Letter on the Climate Crisis, SHALOM CTR., https://theshalomcenter.
org/civicrm/petition/sign?sid=17 [https://perma.cc/2NCG-8TSC] (“In Leviticus 26,
the Torah warns us that if we refuse to let the Earth rest, it will “rest” anyway,
despite us and upon us – through drought and famine and exile that turn an
entire people into refugees.”).
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humanity’s approach to dealing with risk is the product of genetic
programming and some is learned.
We have already come a long way. Historically, traditions
were the justification for action. Traditions have become less
important and social practices are under continual examination
and reform.100 Risk has displaced the divine and the magical. In
a sense, science has grown up. According to sociologist Niklas
Luhmann, “[society] seeks to comprehend misfortune in the form
of risk. And no longer, for example, in the form of magic and
witchcraft; and hardly any longer in the form of religion, having
accepted a purely benevolent God and a devil who has forfeited
his cosmological function if not his very existence.”101 We do not
accept fate as causation.102 At least these views seem to be held
by many of us in the West.
Thoughts of risk occur earlier in our thinking than thoughts
of doom, and for that reason, risk considerations are important
for this article. Risk has an option or a choice built into it. There
is no choice in doom. By the time we think of doom in a given
situation, we have finished thinking of risk. It’s too late; risk has
become reality. When it comes to thinking about catastrophic
collapse, at least there is hope implicit in risk, whereas with
doom there can be no hope. In that sense, risk is a positive. It
represents a challenge, even an opportunity.
Weighing risk is a way of analyzing our place and our
situation in the world. To some degree, risk analysis is in the
process of displacing religion in that regard. This change may or
may not be desirable. There is nothing to stop us from relying on
both.

100. Consider, for example, the traditional Papal position on birth control
and its functional irrelevance in light of the negative replacement birthrate in
modern Italy.
101. NIKLAS LUHMANN, RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, at viii (Walter de
Gruyter ed., Rhodes Barrett trans., 1993).
102. British sociologist Anthony Giddens contends that the concepts of risk
and fate are antithetical. When weighing risk, there is no divine influence, no
magic, no active cosmic spirit. Fate and destiny may exist, but risk is dominant.
See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 111 (1990).
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A. How We Learn to Approach Risk as Individuals
At the larger level society is interested in risk. In part, this is
because we all know risk. It’s part of our normal development. As
teenagers, we test boundaries. We take risks in order to learn
about ourselves and the world around us. Taking risks is part of
finding out what we are capable of doing.103
Risk, experienced as part of the teen brain’s development, is
hard-wired into every one of us.104 We are each bio-chemically
“programmed” to seek risk as part of our development. As teens,
we seek the new and the edge105 in order to get the thrill of
anticipation and a reward of dopamine.106 We may desire risk in
order to keep things interesting.107
This choice is not so unusual. Keeping life interesting may
ultimately be an object of concern. When it comes to teens, we
may need to decide whether it is preferable to busy teens or to
guide them. Either or both may be preferable to teens staying on
autopilot. Accidents and death rates tell us that teens do not do a
good job of selecting the risks to take.108
On the other hand, once we become adults, our view changes
as our frontal lobes have become connected to our brains.109 We
become responsible, responsible for ourselves and then also for
others. “To take unnecessary risks is commonly seen as foolhardy,

103. See FRANCES E. JENSEN & AMY ELLIS NUTT, THE TEENAGE BRAIN: A
NEUROSCIENTIST’S SURVIVAL GUIDE TO RAISING ADOLESCENTS AND YOUNG ADULTS
103–04 (2015).
104. See id.; BARBARA STRAUCH, THE PRIMAL TEEN: WHAT THE NEW
DISCOVERIES ABOUT THE TEENAGE BRAIN TELL US ABOUT OUR KIDS 204 (2003).
105. See STRAUCH, supra note 104, at 96–105. In our modern world, teens
flirt with death as part of normal maturation. See id. at 188. Those adults who
bungee jump or engage in other extreme sports have not stopped. See DEBORAH
LUPTON, RISK 149–50 (1999).
106. See JENSEN & NUTT, supra note 103, at 105–10.
107. Overcoming risks can be a most positive experience. Whether bungee
jumping or smoking cigarettes, engaging in risky behavior is often merely part
of an escape from everyday life. We don’t want too much predictability, let alone
boredom. LUPTON, supra note 103, at 149–51 (citing STANLEY COHEN & LAURIE
TAYLOR, ESCAPE ATTEMPTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF RESISTANCE TO
EVERYDAY LIFE 160 (2d rev. ed., 1992)).
108. See Teenagers, INS. INST. FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, HIGHWAY LOSS DATA
INST. (2013), http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/teenagers/fatalityfacts/teenagers
[http://perma.cc/59RB-R8L9].
109. See JENSEN & NUTT, supra note 103, at 37.
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careless, irresponsible, and even ‘deviant’, evidence of an
individual’s ignorance or lack of ability to regulate self.”110 Our
view and our behavior tends to change for the significant risks we
can sense. That is the adult side of risk.
As we take the adult perspective, and we search, we find
more and more risks. It would seem that humanity has an
inherent tendency to run into problems involving risk. But we all
take risks, and we think that risk taking is not inherently bad.
We regard taking risks as an important part of human liberty.
These are our risk assumptions. They color our risk
perceptions.
B. How We Perceive Risk
Some risks are unacceptable—unacceptable to parents, to
individuals, and to society as a whole. When risks are greater
than what we’re used to, they get special treatment. At least they
should. But when we don’t understand new risks, typically we
find it difficult to know how to act.
New technology, even if it is just new to one of us, makes this
easy to see. A child touches a Glock for the first time. The risks
are unknown. Squirt guns don’t kill family members. Imagine the
child’s immediate confusion. This is risk. It seems strange, but it
is within the realm of probability.
Probability is not always straightforward. As Jason Daley
points out in Discover Magazine, “our risk perception is often at
direct odds with reality.”111
Consider the introduction of
HIV/AIDS. This new disease meant that past behavior with
certain risks, now has a new, much greater, risk.
Such great risks have an impact. They cause an adjustment
to our thinking, sometimes known as reflexivity.112
As

110. LUPTON, supra note 105, at 148.
111. Jason Daley, What You Don’t Know Can Kill You, DISCOVER: SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE (Oct. 3, 2011), http://discovermagazine.com/
2011/jul-aug/11-what-you-dont-know-can-kill-you [http://perma.cc/69BR-PMZ5].
112. “Reflexivity means a response to conditions that arouse fear or anxiety
that is active rather than passive. Reflexivity is a defining characteristic of all
human action, involving the continual monitoring of action and its contexts.”
LUPTON, supra note 105, at 15 (citing GIDDENS, supra note 102, at 36–37); see
also BECK, supra note 19, at 78–79.
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technology, science, and our environment change around us, we
must be vigilant to know about and respond to the risks.
Our social networks are critical.113 People learn about risk
either over a lifetime of experiences or through their social
networks.114 We like to feel safe with what we know. When we do
not, we may feel that risks are beyond our control and therefore
more a matter of fate. Social networks may relieve some of these
feelings and help us gain a deeper understanding.
Some people and situations, it seems, defy the odds; genetic
predispositions can override a healthy diet; fate can override
preventative action.115 Preventative action is not fail-safe. On
occasion, even preventative action itself has been known to snare
the risk-averse.
Risks different from or greater than what we are used to can
exist beyond our perceptions. It is very possible for there to be a
lot more risk than what each of us has (or even all of us have)
experienced (or even learned about) to date.
Teenagers, because their brains are not fully developed, don’t
always see the consequences of their actions. That part of the
brain, known as the pre-frontal cortex has not yet developed or
engaged.116 At the same time, as we will see, the risks facing all
of us have increased. Our teens are not exempt from the
increased risks of modern society. Their risks seem to be greater

113. The genetic endowment of the individual human is unlikely to see
modern risks as clearly as do connected and educated groups. Jason Daley
provides support in Discover Magazine:
Our hardwired gut reactions developed in a world full of hungry
beasts and warring clans, where they served important functions.
Letting the amygdala (part of the brain’s emotional core) take over
at the first sign of danger, milliseconds before the neocortex (the
thinking part of the brain) was aware a spear was headed for our
chest was probably a very useful adaptation. Even today, those
nano-pauses and gut responses save us from getting flattened by
buses or dropping a brick on our toes. But in a world where risks are
presented in parts-per-billion statistics or as clicks on a Geiger
counter, our amygdala is out of its depth.
Daley, supra note 111.
114. See LUPTON, supra note 105, at 112.
115. See id. at 111 (citing Charlie Davison et al., The Limits of Lifestyle:
Reassessing ‘Fatalism’ in the Popular Culture of Illness Prevention, 34 SOC. SCI.
& MED. 675 (1992)).
116. See JENSEN & NUTT, supra note 103, at 107, 269–70.
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than ever.117
In order to protect teens’ futures, parents
sometimes need to step in—like a surrogate pre-frontal cortex—to
provide a measure of foresight.
In a sense, we are all still teenagers. As adults, we may still
engage in that same risky behavior we learned earlier. Maybe we
should listen to that little worry in the back of our mind, the one
that says, “Slow down.” As with teenagers, not only are the risks
greater, the environment is more challenging than what our
forebears experienced. And just like teenagers, we may have
some trouble seeing it. And it is more complicated than that.
Seeing the problem, alone, is not enough.
Science is taking us to new places on the roadmap of risk. If
we are not flexible enough to modify our views of risk and our
behavior, we may wind up like the teenager who failed to
appreciate the risk of catching HIV/AIDS and what it meant. Our
decision making must become more flexible, and we must become
more aware of these new risks—and create social and legal
structures and systems so that we are ready for even more.
Anthony Giddens writes about risk and modernity. He describes a
“risk culture” in which the potentially disastrous effects of risks
are far more wide-reaching than in previous generations.118
Millions stand to be affected by errors, whether the errors bring
about economic collapse or a nuclear meltdown.119
According to Giddens, the notion of risk moves through two
stages. In the first stage, assessment of risk is seen as a means of
promoting certainty, with the precision of risk calculations
“bringing the future under control.”120 However, “[t]he second
stage is where we are not able to precisely calculate risk, but
rather develop ‘scenarios’ of risk with various degrees of
plausibility. One example is global warming, subject [at that
time] to expert dispute over whether or not it is happening and
how serious its ramifications are.”121
117. See id. at 104.
118. Variations in risk perceptions may be cultural as much as they may be
generational.
119. ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY
IN THE LATE MODERN AGE 4 (1991).
120. Anthony Giddens, Living in a Post-traditional Society, in REFLEXIVE
MODERNIZATION: POLITICS, TRADITION, AND AESTHETICS IN THE MODERN SOCIAL
ORDER 56, 58 (1994).
121. LUPTON, supra note 105, at 74.
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There is growing doubt about the validity of knowledge, but
overall we are not discussing or dealing with that doubt or its
seriousness directly. As experts increasingly disagree about risks
and lay people instead are forced to make their own imprecise
assessments, “people have become increasingly cynical about the
claims to progress offered by traditional modernity.”122 Cynicism,
however, does not constitute action. And as “normal accidents”
increase, we increasingly view government’s failure to provide
adequate security as scandalous.123
Our perceptions are critical. We must develop them well and
with clarity as they shape our responses. Let us organize our
responses according to our perceptions and our views.
C. How We Respond to Risk
There are many factors that contribute to both how we
perceive and how we respond to risks. Lack of social autonomy,
lack of autonomy in the workplace, and anxiety about job loss are
among the factors that influence how we construct, view, and deal
with risk.124 The choices or lack of choices we face when
confronted with risk bear greatly on our state of mind and our
behavior. People may respond habitually rather than rationally to
the risks they see, by merely including a pattern of risk avoidance
in their everyday lives.125 Our routine responses, however, may
not constitute sufficient action when confronted with new risks.
Consider some of our routine responses.
122. Id. at 75.
123. BECK, supra note 19, at 56 (citing CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL
ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES (1984)). An increase in
normal accidents is consistent with the act of one painting backwards into a
corner. Encounters with the wall become more common.
“Normal accidents” is the name Charles Perrow (1984) gives in his
book to this predictability with which what was considered
impossible occurs – and the more emphatically it is denied, the
sooner, more destructively and shockingly it occurs. In the chain of
publicly revealed catastrophes, near-catastrophes, whitewashed
security faults and scandals the technically centred claim to the
control of governmental and industrial authority shatters – quite
independently of the established measure of hazards: the number of
dead, the danger of the contaminations, and so on.”
Id.
124. See LUPTON, supra note 105, at 116–17.
125. See id. at 122.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/2

30

DRAPER - FINAL

2016]

4/28/2016 1:47 PM

NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS

187

For one, we often blame others. When portraying others as a
risk, we have represented them as dirty, unhygienic, pathological,
and contaminating (as vermin). This is what the Nazis did to the
Jews, to justify extermination.126 The difference in our analysis
of many of today’s risks is that there is no identifiable single
source of blame.127 In many instances, as we shall see shortly, we
have only our forebears and ourselves to blame. However, blame
is not productive. It is backward looking and does not contribute
to problem solving.128
We sometimes respond to risk with the paralysis of
confusion, like deer before the headlights of doom.129 We might
lack the political fortitude to face the risks, even the risks of
extinction. Or we may simply be “just one person.” There may be
many reasons—or mere excuses—for our paralysis. Ultimately, if
there is a real risk, the cause of our inaction does not matter.
It may help us to differentiate and distinguish danger from
risk.130 Even after we recognize the risks131—or maybe more
126. See id. at 130.
127. However, we remain capable of scapegoating. Consider Americans’
post-9/11 response of blaming Muslims in general for terrorism.
128. See Joseph Tainter, Competition, Expansion, and Reaction: The
Foundations of Contemporary Conflict, in THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY, supra
note 45, at 174, 190.
The identification of historical scapegoats too easily becomes an
excuse for failures of contemporary action. Moreover, to the extent
that European colonial expansion was made likely by previous
events and processes, such as peer polity competition, the search for
a scapegoat can always be shifted further back in time. A morally
neutral approach to history must be adopted or else dialogue reduces
to accusations and defensiveness.
Id. It may be argued that even torturers may be forgiven. Glen Pettigrove,
Hume on Forgiveness and the Unforgivable, 19 UTILITAS 447, 455–64 (2007).
129. Craig A. Rimmerman, Critical Reflections on the Doomsday,
Apocalyptic Vision, in THE COMING AGE OF SCARCITY, supra note 45, at 283, 293–
94.
Those who worry that the doomsday perspective paralyzes citizens
who might otherwise mobilize politically have a legitimate point. We
should not forget that in the early 1980s the Brown University
student body voted to have cyanide tablets in every student’s
dormitory in case of a nuclear holocaust. Much was made at the time
regarding the resignation, futility, and passivity associated with the
Brown student body’s response.
Id.
130. One deduces a conflictual situation, risk “from a general definition of
the dangers one wishes to prevent.” Robert Castel, From Dangerousness to Risk,
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precisely, the dangers inherent in an external situation—the
omission of prevention can constitute a risk. The decision to take
or not to take an action, in relation to a danger, can constitute a
risk. According to sociologist Niklas Luhmann, risk is the
consequence of decision, whereas danger is caused externally.132
Some of those risks are manmade, based on decisions. And some
of those risks are external to human choice, and those really are
dangers. As dangers are interpreted, decision risks are created.
We live in a world where mixtures of both risk and danger are
plentiful.
Risks can live on both sides of a decision involving a
danger.133 As dangers are out of human control, a failure to
respond can seem to be more politically safe than a response that
turns out as failed or unnecessary.
The risks of dealing with dangers pose a critical pair of
questions (reliability and cost) for any risk analysis connected
with collapse or extinction. Both the reliability of risk prevention
and its cost must be considered. When it came to global warming,
the George W. Bush administration decided that it would cost our
economy too much to do anything about it.134 It did not appear to
be a matter of reliability of prevention so much as cost.
in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 281, 288 (Grahm
Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
131. See, e.g., DIRK PROSKE, CATALOGUE OF RISKS: NATURAL, TECHNICAL,
SOCIAL AND HEALTH RISKS (2009), for a compilation and description of risk
measures and their interdependence.
132. See LUHMANN, supra note 101, at 21–22.
133. Luhmann explains:
Even if it is only a question of danger in the sense of natural
disaster, the omission of prevention becomes a risk. It is apparently
easier to distance oneself politically from dangers than from risks—
even where the probability of loss or the extent of loss is greater in
the case of danger than in that of risk; and presumably also
independently of the question (but this would require meticulous
inquiry) of how reliable prevention in each case would be and what it
would cost.
Id. at 31.
134. See Press Release, The White House, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer
(Mar. 28, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/briefings/
20010328.html [https://perma.cc/K5UM-KE6D]; see also Terry Barker & Paul
Ekins, The Costs of Kyoto for the U.S. Economy, 25 ENERGY J. 53, 53 (2004);
Charles Wilson, Global Warming Issue Still With Us, BULK TRANSPORTER (Aug.
1,
2001),
http://bulktransporter.com/archive/global-warming-issue-still-us
[http://perma.cc/Z4Q9-JSL9].
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Let’s say you decide you cannot touch that third rail of risk,
human extinction, and you say, “The risks are too great; I can’t
get involved. I might make a mistake.” If your existence and your
way of life are part of the foreseeable cause, there is an obligation
to respond. A duty is imposed on the humanity who has driven
and pushed risk out of control to get it back under control before
catastrophe occurs.135 If that is impossible, we should at least
minimize the impact.
When it comes to evaluating collapse or even extinction, the
concept of risk comes into play. The way we view risk makes a
difference. Our view frames our response.
Because perceptions of risk are influenced by our experiences
and beliefs, assessments of and responses to risk are subjective.
Yet some risks seem clear cut. When one looks at the risks posed
by HIV/AIDS or guns, for example, there also seems to be a more
objective side.136
The possibility of human extinction may present an objective
risk, but how we weigh that risk against other concerns depends
on our perspective, and in that sense, the risk is subjective. It is
based on the values we hold.
An objective risk tends to lead us to examine cause and
effect, scientific causation. When we examine for risks, we tend to
look for some human intervention as playing a role, and
sometimes we can track causation to our own behavior.137
Some of that causation may be a side effect of our own
technological achievements.138 According to cultural studies
professor Nico Stehr and technology professor Gotthard
Bechmann, “Technology and the concomitant awareness of
capability has occupied nature’s territory, and both surmise and
experience indicate that this can more easily prove destructive
than constructive. The fear that things could go wrong is
135. The nature and extent of duty to avoid catastrophe merits deeper
consideration elsewhere.
136. That objectivity has holes in it. First, some teenagers (or others) may
not share adults’ view of objective risk. Secondly, over time, with HIV vaccines
and gun locks or other technology, risks may change and the views held by
adults may change.
137. See generally TED STEINBERG, ACTS OF GOD: THE UNNATURAL HISTORY
OF NATURAL DISASTER IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2006).
138. Some causation can also come from ignoring the risks that we have
created or enhanced. See id.
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therefore growing rapidly and with it the risk apportioned to
decision-making.”139 The knowledge that the choices others make
can have a catastrophic impact on one’s life is unsettling and is
growing as well.140 Subjectively, we know something is wrong.
There are two competing approaches to the study of risk in
the social sciences. One is quantitative, characterized by
statistical modeling and cost-benefit analysis; the other is
sociological, characterized by social views, trends and theories.
The quantitative approach has been referred to as the “objective
view of risk,” while the sociological approach has been labeled the
“subjective view of risk.”141 Each attempts to inform social policy.
How we respond to risk depends on our view. We have
different views of risk. They fall into at least three main
categories with the addition of an analysis of the moral view of
risk, rooted in religion and philosophy. I am concerned with
building a case against a purely objective view of risk. For the
purposes of this argument, let us acknowledge but dispense with
the subjective view. I will start with the objective view and then
compare it to aspects of the moral view of risk.
1. The “Objective” View of Risk
The quantitative type of risk study, the objective view of risk,
is also known as the technico-scientific approach to
decisionmaking. It arises from the fields of engineering, statistics,
actuarialism, psychology, epidemiology, and economics. Debates
over risk in these fields tend to consider how well a risk has been
identified or calculated (and to what level of confidence), the
effects of the risk, the accuracy of the science that has been used
to measure and calculate risk, and the degree to which predictive
models are inclusive.
These days, many in the fields of business, insurance, and
economics favor the use of the term “uncertainty” over “risk”
139. Nico Stehr & Gotthard Bechmann, Introduction, in NIKLAS LUHMANN,
RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, at xxxii (Rhodes Barrett trans., 2005).
140. There has been a prompt legislative response to the twenty-first
century’s most visible cause of this unsettling feeling. The USA Patriot Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 84 Stat. 1116 (2001), was passed only six weeks after 9/11. And
the depth of that unsettled feeling, in part, then permitted the pursuit of two
wars—and yet more unsettled feelings.
141. See LUPTON, supra note 105, at 19.
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when considering potential catastrophes. They take the view,
developed by economist Frank Knight,142 that uncertainty has
unknown probabilities, but with risk, the probabilities are known.
Clearly, when it comes to risk of human extinction or collapse, the
probabilities are unknown.143 Hopefully, they will never become
known.
For the purposes of this discussion I will instead use the
term, “risk,”144 which is widely used in numerous fields, including
law145 and sociology,146 when the probabilities are unknown.
When one talks about extinction or collapse, risk makes more
sense intuitively. It lies somewhere between common notions of
uncertainty and danger. “Uncertainty” does not begin to convey
the seriousness of the issue at hand.147 Yet “danger” conveys a
sense of alarm148 that some people may not accept. “Risk” it is.
One “objective” method of quantitatively measuring and
calculating risk is unrestricted cost-benefit analysis (CBA). CBA
is a decision procedure;149 each implementation weighs and
compares costs and benefits anew. An estimate of relative
probability may operate between the costs and the benefits.
Ultimately, CBA’s design, inter alia, maximizes property rights
and consequent liberty.
There are different methods to calculate the “cost” side just
as there are different methods to arrive at the “benefit” side of the
142. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921).
143. Huge risks with a small probability of coming about can nevertheless
occur with more frequency than is statistically probable. Daniel A. Farber,
Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 145–47 (2003). Farber’s arguments add
credibility to arguments for precaution.
144. “In everyday language the term ‘risk’ is understood as a pseudonym
for danger or peril, for some unhappy event which may happen to someone; it
designates an objective threat.” François Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE
FOUCAULT EFFECT, supra note 130, at 197, 199.
145. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE
(2004).
146. See, e.g., BECK, supra note 19; LUHMANN, supra note 101; LUPTON,
supra note 105.
147. Some in economics would insist that the term is “uncertainty” in any
event.
148. What’s more, danger is outside of human control, whereas risk is
within human control.
149. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 12, 62–100 (2006).
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analysis. Some risk measures of costs, as with environmental
regulations, are done by calculating the number of lives saved.
Costs can also be calculated as the value, within a single life, of
the number of years (containing measures of the quality of those
years) that have been or will be lost or placed at risk.
Much has been written on the use of cost-benefit analysis to
solve issues of catastrophic risk. For Judge Richard A. Posner,150
cost-benefit analysis is indispensable in any rational decisionmaking process related to catastrophic risk.151 Since President
Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291,152 cost-benefit analysis has
been the manner in which executive agencies of the United States
government measure the extent and effect of potential
Cost-benefit analysis continues as the risk
regulations.153
management tool of the U.S. government.154
However, theorists of the objective view of risk are moving
away from CBA, toward well-being analysis (WBA). The failings
of CBA are well documented—and CBA is scathingly rebuked—
by law professor Lisa Heinzerling and economist Frank
Ackerman in their fine 2004 work Priceless: On Knowing the Price
of Everything and the Value of Nothing. University of Chicago law
professor Jonathan Masur, a one-time proponent of CBA, and his
co-authors have more recently accepted Heinzerling and
Ackerman’s position that CBA should no longer be used as a
decision procedure.155 Instead, Masur and co-authors recommend
that decisions be made by use of WBA.156
150. Judge Posner sits on the Seventh Circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals.
151. See POSNER, supra note 145, at 139. However, Posner’s work has been
severely criticized. See Pat O’Malley, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, by
Richard A. Posner, 4 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 187, 187–89 (2005) (book review).
152. Cost-benefit analysis was adopted as an overriding element of
regulation, wherever not forbidden by statute. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3
C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (revoked 1994); Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277–78 (2001).
153. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 149, at 3–4.
154. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011).
155. John Bronsteen, Christopher J. Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur,
Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1689 (2013).
But see Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and
Bayesian Cost-Benefit Analysis (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 730, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2646063 [https://perma.cc/PJU4PGYP].
156. Bronsteen, Buccafusco, & Masur, supra note 155, at 1615.
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After examining unrestricted cost-benefit analysis and its
temporal tool, discounting, I will conclude coverage of the
objective view of risk with a few thoughts on WBA.
a. Unrestricted Cost-Benefit Analysis
Economists use cost-benefit analysis as a decision-making
tool. CBA’s methodology was originally developed as a decisionmaking tool for flood management.157 More recently, CBA has
been used for the same thing in the Netherlands.158 Unrestricted
CBA159 simply weighs both sides, the cost and the benefit, to help
governments and businesses make “more efficient” decisions.
In the business world, CBA holds tremendous appeal;
efficiency is a good thing. CBA helps businesses make efficient
decisions that in turn help maximize profits.160 Of course,
humanity needs business decision-making and at least some
efficiency to continue. We need our markets to be able to handle
the trillions of decisions and adjustments in a much more
efficient manner than that provided by any other model. CBA
works easily in the market context as it focuses on market
efficiency and wealth maximization.

157. See JULES DUPUIT, ÉTUDES THÉORIQUES ET PRATIQUES SUR LE
MOUVEMENT DES EAUX COURANTES: SUIVIES DE CONSIDÉRATIONS RELATIVES AU
RÉGIME DES GRANDES EAUX, AU DÉBOUCHÉ À LEUR DONNER, ET À LA MARCHE DES
ALLUVIONS DANS LES RIVIÈRES A FOND MOBILE [STUDIES ON FLOOD MANAGEMENT]
(1848). Costs of flood control were weighed against the savings with a calculated
probability of the risk of flood.
158. David Wolman, Turning the Tides, WIRED, Jan. 2009, at 108, 111.
Employing the Dutch approach to flood risk analysis, with measurement of
potential cost of damage helping to determine the amount of protection afforded
by government action, might violate the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 113. Consider
the need for equal protection under the law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Ultimately, humanity must protect equality and fundamental rights.
159. Uses of CBA and unrestricted CBA are interchangeable here. Law or
regulation could impose restrictions on CBA. Instead, CBA is used to restrict or
limit regulation.
160. There are two reasons why the entrepreneur is expected to maximize
profits. One is the evolutionary expectation connected to survival in a
competitive world; the other involves preferences in the institutional and social
role of the entrepreneur in the market. Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, A Preference for
Selfish Preferences: The Problem of Motivations in Rational Choice Political
Science, 38 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 361, 365 (2008) (citing A.A. Alchian, Uncertainty,
Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950)). The concept of
profits need not be static; profits can come in many forms.
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Implicit in CBA is an expression of human preference.161
CBA considers preference, generally calculated in terms of dollars
or other unitary metric.162 All human interests, in the eyes of
those using CBA, may be measured by a common standard, and
between any two competing interests some quantitative rate of
exchange can be determined that enables the rational balancing
of one against the other.163
i.

Three Immediate Problems with CBA

This sounds straightforward, but CBA has three
complications worthy of immediate note. By visiting them, we will
see better the functions and limits of CBA. After that, I will
review the arguments in favor of the decision procedure. The
three complications are externalities, the property right in CBA,
and the problem implicit in CBA’s governmental application.
a) Externalities
The notion of externalities relates to preferences in CBA.
Some things don’t get calculated into costs and benefits when
employing CBA.164 These additional factors, known as
externalities in the neoclassical model of economic theory, have
no direct cost to the entity making the decision (business or
161. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 149, at 12.
162. Id. at 13; Keating, supra note 20, at 677.
163. This goes way back, certainly to Nicholas Kaldor’s early efforts in
welfare economics where income aggregation and distribution was the subject of
the work. See, e.g., Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550–51 (1939). It may go
back to Bismarck’s economists in late nineteenth-century Germany.
Risk can work to have considerations of life and death on both sides of a costbenefit equation. However, financial considerations tend to be more common.
The notion of cost is most commonly expressed in financial terms. Thus,
currency tends to be the unitary metric.
When multiple risks are involved, the matter of “risk-risk tradeoffs” arises.
See RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(John Graham & Jonathan Weiner eds., 1995), for a more economic analysis of
this phenomenon.
164. Costs are weighed against benefits. Probability is factored in, and
assumptions are made based on those costs and benefits. Inevitably, some
factors go unmeasured, beyond the realm of consideration. Those are
externalities. In neo-classical economic theory, costs and benefits do not capture
them. They may not fit the model, or they may be too difficult to calculate.
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otherwise), but they do have a cost to others or to society as a
whole. We can thank economist A.C. Pigou for making the
concept of externalities part of economic jargon. He viewed them
largely as market failures.165
Externalities are side-effects. When we try to fix each with a
band-aid, it’s like playing whack-a-mole. As side effects ripple
outward from an event, and in places compound and multiply, we
are likely to find that chasing externalities is an endless and
frustrating task.166
Let’s define externalities. An externality is an imposition of
harm, cost, or even something positive, that is external to the
calculations used at the source. Pollution is an easy example.
Unless the polluter pays for all damage and its consequences
(some of which may not yet be known), at least some costs would
be external to the polluter’s activity.
b) CBA’s Property Right
Secondly, there is a property right, a fundamental right,
implicit in CBA. According to economist Harold Demsetz, the
right of property includes “the right to benefit or harm oneself or
others.”167 With harms to others, we encounter a problem with
the economic view: There is an imposition rather than
cooperation, and that imposition can constitute a negative impact
on any of our fundamental rights, including life itself. We need to
think with care when we use our property.168
165. Carl Circo, Does Sustainability Require a New Theory of Property
Rights? 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 91, 116 (2009) (citing STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS
OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 108 (2004)).
166. As Ronald Coase notes, “[I]f I am right, current economic analysis is
incapable of handling many of the problems to which it purports to give
answers.” RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 15 (1988)
(noting that The Problem of Social Cost has not had immense influence on the
field of economics though he believes, in time, it will). Contrary to conventional
wisdom, Coase did not call for the internalization of externalities. Pierre Schlag,
Coase Minus the Coase Theorem—Some Problems with Chicago Transaction
Cost Analysis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 175, 185 (2013).
167. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 347 (1967). Demsetz’s theory of economics supports the violation of
law as long as it is done in the name of maximizing profits. Beware. If anyone is
above the law, their self-interest could harm the health and safety of all.
168. Property systems are not oriented toward careful thought. They are
already quite well established and integrated with economic systems. Law
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The big problem arises with the implementation of those
principles, those property rights, when their cumulative
impositions and consequent risks pose a significant and
foreseeable risk to statistical lives, or even to all life. When the
externalities inherent in our economic system (e.g., too much CO2
based on the imposition of property rights) pose a significant and
foreseeable risk to the human community, it’s time to reconsider
our priorities. We can justify this especially for high cost risks.169
Maybe the issue is how a sound system of life, liberty, and
property should consider and develop rules to address
externalities. We shall see. Externalities are part of CBA, and our
property regime helps enhance them.170
c) Regulatory Application of CBA
Finally, we encounter the problem implicit in the
governmental application of CBA: CBA is used to regulate
against risks to life, liberty, and property. As the use of CBA is a

professor Carl Circo says Demsetz believed that property must be governed by
economic principles and community preferences for private ownership:
“Whatever the property regime, however, he argued that basic economic
considerations dictate that ‘the emergence of new private or state-owned
property rights will be in response to changes in technology and relative prices.’”
Circo, supra note 165, at 118 (quoting Demsetz, supra note 167, at 350). There is
nothing wrong with Demsetz’s analysis per se, but humanity may also need to
change its systems of ownership and use in response to catastrophic risk.
169. Demsetz does not limit himself to a competitive perspective.
[I]n a much later piece, Demsetz concluded that “communal rights
are the more efficient social arrangement under some
circumstances.” Similarly, Robert Ellickson has shown that some
forms of group ownership of land can be more efficient than
individual ownership, especially within a close-knit group, for
certain limited purposes, such as establishing the most efficient land
boundaries for a particular land use or to spread risks efficiently in
certain situations involving high-cost risks.
Circo, supra note 165, at 118 (quoting Harold Demsetz, Frischmann’s View of
“Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” 4 REV. OF L. & ECON. 127, 130 (2008);
citing Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1332–35,
1341–44 (1993)).
170. Using Demsetz’s approach of internalization via the allocation of
property rights is not the only means by which externalities may be
internalized. And in some cases it may not be the most effective. Civil liability,
regulation, and criminal sanctions are other means to battle externalities. Each
can limit only certain externalities and can function only as a band-aid applied
to reduce the effect rather than to get at the cause.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/2

40

DRAPER - FINAL

2016]

4/28/2016 1:47 PM

NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS

197

norm in governmental risk analysis,171 we cannot talk about the
way governments address risk without addressing CBA. In the
interest of efficiency, costs attributable to regulation are carefully
examined and minimized by advocates and regulators. According
to philosopher John Rawls, CBA assumes “that all human
interests are commensurable, and that between any two, there
always exists some rate of exchange in terms of which it is
rational to balance the protection of one against the protection of
the other.”172 Regulations and protection, the benefits, cannot be
justified using CBA without calculating and considering the costs.
However, when costs of regulation exceed its benefits there is
an efficiency problem. According to law professor Gregory
Keating, “[e]conomic theory is deeply critical of pressing
precaution beyond the point of cost-justification.” To press
precaution beyond the point of maximum efficiency is regarded as
irrational. We are all better off with more dollars and fewer
precautions. Additional precaution makes us worse off. “Our
welfare could be improved by retreating back to the point of costjustified precaution and by putting the money saved to better use
elsewhere.”173 This fiscal limitation is imposed on, for example,
environmental
regulations.
The
U.S.
government’s
implementation of CBA is part and parcel of the regulatory
system for risk and appears to cross nearly all administrative
boundaries.174
Unfortunately, CBA is not designed to regulate risk. It
cannot measure all risk; it misses externalities. CBA captures the
financial part of the equation and is part of decision-making. But
CBA is designed—and used—to maximize efficiency and thus to
help maximize profits—which maximizes impact. In this way
171. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 168–78 (demonstrating government
use of CBA through thirty-six stylized scenarios), for a nice description of
regulatory implementation of CBA.
172. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 312 (rev. ed. 1996).
173. Keating, supra note 20, at 659. Keating notes that it is fundamental to
the economic analysis of risk that taking more than cost-justified precaution is
wasteful and irrational. Id. at 659 n.19 (citing LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 52 (2002); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE
AND CONSEQUENCE 17 (1984); Herman B. Leonard & Richard J. Zeckhauser,
Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legitimacy, in
VALUES AT RISK 31, 35 (Douglas MacClean ed., 1986)).
174. However, CBA is not used for at least some decisions involving the
U.S. military.

41

DRAPER - FINAL

198

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

4/28/2016 1:47 PM

[Vol. 33

CBA adds to risk, especially when replicated in billions of
decisions.
University of Chicago’s Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner,
recent proponents of CBA, are correct to recognize that CBA is an
inappropriate tool for certain kinds of decision-making, especially
political decisions.175 However, politics is often about money,176
and we have built that translation into our regulatory system
through the use of CBA, which encourages maximum gain.
Unfortunately, in certain regulatory contexts CBA is used as a
politically-palatable substitute for morality, but even then it’s
still largely about the money.
In CBA, we encounter numerous problems and
inconsistencies with valuation. Consider the crafting of
environmental regulations, which, according to Frank Ackerman
and Lisa Heinzerling, “has almost always involved consideration
of economic costs, with or without formal cost-benefit techniques.
What is unique to cost-benefit analysis, and far more
problematic,” they argue, “is the other side of the balance, the
monetary valuation of the benefits of life, health, and nature
itself.”177 Typically, we do not value these gifts, these ends, in
dollar terms, but economists do. As a result, we have a limited
view of our economic benefits in which “analysts often ignore the
distinction between valuing risk and valuing life, and act as
though they have produced a valuation of life itself.”178 Our first
valuation problem is that our view of the benefits of regulation
has been too limited.179

175. “Cost-benefit analysis cannot cope with inherently political questions
involving contested normative issues. . . such as abortion, affirmative action,
and religious accommodation.” Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate
Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1557, 1563
(2011). These political and policy decisions are not fit for regulatory agencies:
“Instead of looking to cost-benefit analysis to resolve political questions, in
certain cases, policymakers must instead make political judgments.” Id.
176. “[I]n a capitalist society such as the United States a connection
between money and political power is inevitable.” MICHAEL L. MEZEY,
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: LEGISLATORS AND THEIR CONSTITUENTS 191 (2008).
177. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1557.
178. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 68.
179. An effort to expand the view of benefits should not require us to guess
at their value. In deference to current law, recent work by Masur and Posner
claims that it is better to just “guess” at the values of unquantified benefits than
to try to calculate the unquantifiable. Masur & Posner, supra note 155, at 44.
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If life, health, or nature receive an artificially low value, less
regulation and less protection is justified. As life, health, and the
environment have no natural prices, we need to consider how
artificial valuations are calculated. Contingent valuation surveys
represent a kind of opinion poll in which researchers survey a
cross-section of the affected population for how much,
hypothetically, they would be willing to pay to preserve or protect
something that can’t be bought in a store.180 These surveys are
used to produce prices for things that appear to be priceless: “For
example, the average American household is supposedly willing
to pay $257 to prevent the extinction of bald eagles, $208 to
protect humpback whales, and $80 to protect gray wolves. These
numbers are quite large[,] since there are about 100 million
households in the country . . . .”181 We’ll return to regulation. For
now, let’s stick with pricing.
ii. Pricing
One problem with the contingent valuation survey is in the
manner of survey and tabulation itself. Responses that deviate
from a range are tossed out, as are responses of protest. “[P]rotest
rates of 50 percent or more are common.”182 Protests may speak
to the impropriety of pricing the priceless, but economists
overcome protests by disregarding them entirely. The result is
precise data that is blindly inaccurate.
Another approach to pricing the unpriced offered by
Ackerman and Heinzerling, “infers what people are willing to pay
from observation of their behavior in other markets. To assign a
dollar value to risks to human life, for example, economists
usually calculate the extra wage—or “wage premium”—that is
paid to workers who accept riskier jobs.”183 Pay differential for
the riskier job is used to price the employee’s value of his or her

180. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1557–58.
181. Id. at 1558.
182. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 164 (citing ROBERT C.
MITCHELL & R.T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS 34 (1989)).
According to Ackerman and Heinzerling, “Dismissing these responses creates a
danger that valuations of health and nature will reflect an ad hoc process of
censorship by economists, not a true cross-section of popular attitudes.” Id.
183. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1558.
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own life.184 By this approach, a life was worth about $6.3 million
in the year 2000185 and from $7 to $9.1 million in 2013.186
The value, or price if you will, varies by calculator and by
geographic location.187 It is not necessarily an average; the
elderly may be devalued.188 Prospective value may also vary by
the circumstances of death,189 but, prospectively, the value of a

184. Such wage-risk analysis, although widely accepted, is flawed due to an
asymmetry of risk information, limited occupational choices, race
discrimination, and differential values of women and the population outside the
workforce. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 76–80.
185. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1558, 1584 n.20.
Philosopher John Broome points out the inherent problem with this
measurement: “[N]o finite amount of money could compensate a person for the
loss of his life, simply because money is no good to him when he is dead.” John
Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 91, 92 (1978).
186. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 181–82. More recent estimates of value are
in line with this: “[A] reasonable middle ground between infinity and lifetime
earning” produces a recent VSL of about $9 million. W. Kip Viscusi, Pricing
Lives for Corporate and Governmental Risk Decisions, 6 J. BENEFIT-COST
ANALYSIS 227, 244 (2015).
187. “In 2008 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency valued a generic
American life at $7.22 million, while the Department of Transportation uses a
figure of $5.8-million.” Differences in value vary greatly. When evaluating the
cost of lives saved in the prevention of HIV in Africa, the nonprofit group
Population Services International “calculated a cost of $200 to $700 per infection
avoided. Bear in mind: In countries where antiretroviral drugs are not available,
an infection prevented is likely to be a life saved.” Peter Singer, America’s
Shame, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 13, 2009, at B6, B8–B9,
http://chronicle.com/article/America-s-Shame/30309
[https://perma.cc/V65X7D6L].
188. “[I]n 2002, [the U.S. Office of Management and Budget]—for the first
time ever—put its official stamp of approval on [the conclusion that a seventyfive-year-old is not worth as much as a forty-year-old] when it estimated that
people age seventy and older were worth about sixty-three cents on the dollar
compared to younger people.” ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 74
(citing OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, EPA, EPA 420-R-02-022, FINAL REGULATORY
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM UNREGULATED NONROAD
ENGINES, Ch. 10 (2002)). But that’s not the end of the injustice. “The money that
would have been spent protecting the elderly doesn’t go to protecting the young;
it stays in the pockets of the people who are endangering the lives of the
elderly.” Id. at 75.
189. “[E]qual risks of death may not look equally bad. . . . [E]ven for an
ultimate value such as life and death, the social context is decisive in our
evaluation of risks.” Id. at 71 (citing E. J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: AN
INFORMAL INTRODUCTION (4th ed. 1988)).
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life, even if it is just a statistical life, cannot be valued by
expected future earnings. People won’t stand for it.190
The value of a statistical life (VSL) is essential to calculate
the costs and benefits of environmental regulations. Avoided
deaths are the basis (the benefit) for implementing many such
regulations. Since the government uses VSL, Kip Viscusi
advocates that corporations use VSL as a shield, even a safe
harbor, in decision-making where risk involves the loss of lives.191
This could immunize corporations from punitive damage
awards.192
Let’s not overlook the ex post use of VSL. Value is important
after loss as part of corrective justice in tort law.193
Even with a complex system for measuring and valuing risks,
it may be preferable to avoid strict quantitative analysis and find
an easier approach that does not rely on explicit valuations,
valuations of costs or life, health and the environment. There is,
says Richard Posner, “an argument for ranking risks by their
expected costs and deliberately disregarding the lowest ranked
ones.”194 He notes other ways of ranking risks, including “an
argument for giving attention disproportionate from expectedcosts to those risks that are easier to think about because their
probability of materializing is greater, or (a related point) because
they have materialized in the past and so we have actual
experience with them—we don’t have to imagine them.”195 Thus,
we are not tied to using measures of the value of life, health and
nature, especially the lowest ones, which would result in the
greatest “efficiency” and put us at greater risk. However,

190. “A price list with different values for different lives is difficult to
reconcile with ideals of democracy and equal treatment under the law, let alone
the sacredness of every human being.” Id. at 72.
191. Viscusi, supra note 186, at 242.
192. See id.
193. A tort is an injury to person or property. Let’s assume that there are
regulations that protect life, and that some tortfeasor violates those regulations.
The law of torts is invoked, and corrective justice steps in. “Corrective justice . . .
seeks to correct the wrong done to the victim by imposing a comparable evil on
the tortfeasor.” Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, Calabresi, Posner, and Some Common
Areas of Confusion: The Value of Life in Law and Economics 3 (Feb. 17, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345583 [https://perma.cc/J6MJ-STBR].
194. POSNER, supra note 145, at 121.
195. Id.
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arguments in favor of maximizing economic efficiency196 have
been winning the day for decades.197 We are deeply in ecological
debt, and there is no easy way out.
iii. Arguments for CBA
Let us review the arguments in favor of CBA. Over the years,
there have been a number of them. The arguments tend to fall
into two broad categories. First, there are economic assertions
that better results can be achieved through the use of cost-benefit
analysis. Secondly, there is the transparency argument, those
legal and political claims that a more objective and open
government process will come from this kind of analysis.198
We get better results from CBA through efficiency as
efficiency is good.199 When efficiency is maximized, profits are
maximized. When the government minimizes regulatory costs,
the free market is allowed to boom. Efficiency is the lure.200
In order to measure most accurately the costs and the
benefits and arrive at the most efficient result, everything has to
be placed in dollar terms, even life and health. With life and

196. Ultimately, scientifically, humanity is truly more efficient if it uses
less. Efficiency in science and efficiency in economics may not have quite the
same meanings. Currently, the notion of maximizing efficiency in economics
translates into wringing out every possible dollar in benefit.
197. “The objective of society is to maximize economic efficiency and thus
social welfare.” SIMON REICH, THE FRUITS OF FASCISM: POSTWAR PROSPERITY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 32 (1990). Along the same lines, Milton Friedman’s
view that corporations have an obligation to maximize profits (and thus
economic efficiency) won a sweeping victory in the 1980s. Leo E. Strine Jr.,
Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of
Globalization for the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behavior, 58 U. TORONTO
L.J. 241, 259–62 (2008).
198. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1560.
199. “To the economist, the observation that efficiency is good is
tautological because economics defines efficiency as the course of action that
maximizes what human behavior recognizes as good.” Circo, supra note 165, at
125.
200. Ackerman and Heinzerling explain the lure: “Cost-benefit analysis
supposedly furthers efficiency by ensuring that regulations are only adopted
when benefits exceed costs and by helping direct regulators’ attention to those
problems for which regulatory intervention will yield the greatest net benefits.”
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1560.
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health on the line, dollars are measured as a substitute for risk
assessment.201
Add to this a history of special interest groups—or their
economists, attorneys, and other lobbyists—appearing before
congressional committees, commenting on proposed regulations,
or posting information on their web sites bemoaning their high
costs, the extravagant costs, of regulation. They push hard; they
lobby for more favorable numbers and less regulation. They
manipulate CBA to get their desired results, and they argue that
the government’s use of it is inaccurate. The notion that the
current system produces rules that are terribly expensive and
that better economic analysis would protect us from this harmful
result remains one of the persistent arguments offered in favor of
Economists present CBA as a kind of moral
CBA.202
imperative.203 For them, the notion of better economic analysis
means more precise CBA rather than consideration of other
regulatory schemes.
Proponents argue that CBA leads to more open and objective
government decision-making. Ackerman and Heinzerling explain
that agency decision-making based on objective standards is “the
holy grail of administrative law. . . . The idea is to prevent an
agency from either making arbitrary decisions or, more
invidiously, from benefiting politically-favored groups through its
decisions. Cost-benefit analysis has been offered as a means of
constraining agency discretion in this way.”204
CBA seems objective, but using it for regulatory decisions can
lead to bizarre and risky results. We will see the exercise of
subjective choice and discretion in what is arguably an objective
201. Gregory Keating describes the implementation: “‘Cost-benefit’ analysis
requires risks to be reduced to the point where the costs of further precautions
exceed their benefits. If the marginal costs of eliminating significant risks
exceed the marginal benefits, significant risks will continue to exist.” Keating,
supra note 20, at 684–85.
202. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1560–61. “One widely cited
study claims that the cost of life-saving interventions can reach as high as $99
billion for every life-year saved.” Id. at 1561 (citing Tammy O. Tengs et al., FiveHundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK
ANALYSIS 369, 377 app. A (1995)).
203. If CBA is a moral imperative for conservative economists, how come
CBA has not been applied by those economists to missile defense systems? See
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 216–18.
204. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1562.
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approach to decision-making. We will return to CBA after an
introduction to discounting.
b. Introduction to Discounting and Valuation of
the Future
Because we value something differently now than we do in
the future, we use discounting. It is the flip side of earning
interest in a savings account.205 With that savings account, the
bank pays you interest for saving. Your balance accrues the
interest and amounts to more later.206 In economics, that
interest represents something called the “time value of money.”
Discounting is another way to implement the time value of
money. Instead of getting paid interest, one receives less up front.
One gets less by taking her money now as opposed to later (when
it would include interest). For example, with the lottery, the
winner can take the smaller lump sum now or a larger amount
spread over time. When we apply discounting, we are saying that
something is worth less to us tomorrow than it is today. We
prefer to have things now.207
Discounting is necessary in CBA (as most everything is
reduced to the dollar). Some benefits are not immediate, and
some costs do not accrue immediately. When, in the course of
conducting cost-benefit analysis, future benefits or future costs
are encountered, a discount rate is employed. According to
205. “Discounting is just compound interest in reverse.” ACKERMAN &
HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 182.
206. Certainly, with inflation, that amount would need to be greater later.
However, adding an inflation rate and a real interest rate in order to take
inflation into account only complicates the thinking and generally changes
nothing in the outcome. Unfortunately, the psychology of inflation (the looming
nature of price increases) serves to increase consumption.
207. A preference for immediate gratification is implicit in the weighing
process of discounting. How would Ben Franklin view this?
Ben Franklin was a person who believed in sensible habits, in
frugality, in moderation, in discipline. Sometimes he has been
mocked for his attitudes, but on the whole we think it is fair to say
that his mindset was one that many people, at least in principle,
would still find admirable today. Yet discounting discourages all of
the habits of mind and behavior that Franklin embraced.
ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 202. Franklin’s frugality,
moderation, discipline, and moral weighing are a far cry from the public
impatience and empty precision of the mechanics of discounting.
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William R. Cline, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for
International Economics, “[c]onventional discounting, even with
low discount rates, makes present day values of benefits to be
received far in the future vanishingly small. The reason why we
discount the value of expected future benefits is that people tend
Cline
to prefer consumption sooner rather than later.”208
observes that, when asked to choose between getting $100 today
or $100 in a year’s time, most of us prefer $100 now: “When
people save money they forestall consumption today. Generally,
they are only willing to do that because the savings can be
invested to yield an interest premium that ensures future
Discounting encourages
consumption will be larger.”209
consumption.
At a basic level, there are two kinds of discounting: financial
discounting and risk discounting. Financial discounting is dollars
for dollars. Financial discounting pertains to investment return
decisions, but financial discounting is purely financial—at least
until it is applied to something priceless, like life or liberty.
The second kind of discounting, risk discounting, takes many
forms, including gambling, destabilizing speculation, and
stabilizing insurance. Risk discounting includes decisions to risk
something more precious than money or property. Discounting in
the area of the fundamental rights210 of life and liberty carries
special significance. That significance is highlighted in the area of
life and health, where we encounter the characteristic of
irreversibility. The meaning may be expressed with the term
incommensurability, which we will consider shortly.
The discount rates used by neo-classical economists tend to
be based on consumption preferences, preferences in favor of
consumption based upon principles of financial discounting. The
more we consume, the better. The converse is the less we save,
the better. In that sense, discounting de-emphasizes the future. It
provides a justification for us to use, to consume, and to destroy
208. William R. Cline, Meeting the Challenge of Global Warming, in HOW
SPEND $50 BILLION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE 1, 5 (Bjorn Lomborg
ed., 2006).
209. Id.
210. Fundamental rights are, in a basic Constitutional sense, the rights to
life, liberty and property granted under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7 (8th ed. 2010).
TO
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today. Whatever it is, it’s worth less tomorrow. This is the way
discounting works with CBA—and with risk.
i.

Governmental Discounting

When discounting is applied to governmental policy,
especially risk analysis, humanity’s future may be similarly deemphasized.211 Richard Posner contends that, “[t]he effect of
discounting on cost-benefit analyses of responses to catastrophic
risks tends to be dramatic because the benefits of the responses
are likely to be spread out over a very long time while many of
the costs may have to be incurred in the present and near
future.”212 When the costs and benefits of a policy occur at
different times, governments monetize and discount future costs
and benefits and treat them as equivalent to fewer dollars today.
The resulting sale price effect offers a decreased cost of
pollution now. We are to use now in the interest of discounting
those later costs of pollution. With discounting, the present can be
rewarded at the cost of the future,213 as though the future can
always absorb costs shifted forward in time. Many neo-classical
economists foresee no limits,214 but humanity cannot borrow
infinitely against its resource base.215 Ackerman and Heinzerling
211. Ackerman and Heinzerling see discounting as a subversion of the
future through a misuse of preferences. The honoring of rights in the protection
from “workplace hazards and environmental toxins” is lost “when lives saved in
the future are shrunk to insignificance through discounting.” ACKERMAN &
HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 192. Immediate selfishness should not be
allowed to subvert the public judgement that future harms have significance. Id.
Humanity, collectively and individually, should not give up the right to a future.
212. POSNER, supra note 145, at 151. Many of us engage in this kind of
analysis with retirement savings, so it isn’t entirely foreign to us.
213. This is not about financial discounting; one can’t just take the cost
savings and invest them.
214. Those economists employ no accounting for the physical limits of the
Earth. For example, there are limits on the amounts of greenhouse gases such
as carbon that can be sustained in the atmosphere. Humanity is currently
exceeding the limits of the planet with its behavior. See generally JAMES E.
HANSEN, STORMS OF MY GRANDCHILDREN, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE COMING
CLIMATE CATASTROPHE AND OUR LAST CHANCE TO SAVE HUMANITY (2009). It
seems we have a tendency to ignore the most significant risks until it is too late.
Once humanity passes the point of irreversibility, it’s too late. We will have
exceeded the planetary limits too greatly for too long a time.
215. Economist William Baumol recognized the inability to borrow
infinitely in an early article on discounting the benefits of public projects: “If we
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note that discounting employs a worldview of market economics
that typically assumes stable problems with declining control
costs. It treats precautionary investment in environmental
protection as “a needless expense” by ignoring the possibility of
catastrophic and irreversible harms.216 As a result, over time, we
increasingly find that we have turned our backs on known
significant and irreversible risks.
Yet, Judge Posner says discounting is required for CBA to
deal with catastrophic risk.217 In order to use CBA in risk
analysis, we must discount the future. The unspoken reason for
discounting seems to be that we have limited resources and
cannot afford infinite costs, even in the future. What’s more,
discounting is a norm in neo-classical economics.
Instead of looking at the costs of today, let’s consider the
benefits, the value of our future. When we consider a large
number of years, say a few centuries, into the future, discounting
makes considerations of future costs seem miniscule. Ackerman
and Heinzerling provide a great example: “At a discount rate of
five percent, for example, the death of a billion people five
hundred years from now becomes less serious than the death of
one person today.”218 In this regard, applying discounting to long
time frames makes humanity’s future seem meaningless.219 But
discounting is ordinarily a necessary part of an accurate CBA.220
poison our soil so that never again will it be the same, if we destroy the Grand
Canyon and turn it into a hydroelectric plant, we give up assets which like
Goldsmith’s bold peasantry, ‘. . . their country’s pride, when once destroy’d can
never be supplied.’” William J. Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 788, 801 (1968). Irreversibility has significance. See discussion infra
Section III.C.2.b. Humanity should be concerned with irreversibility—and limit
liberty where risks to life are significant.
216. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 185–86.
217. Posner points out that, “as a practical political matter,” it would be
absurd “not to discount future costs at all.” He observes that “the present value
of benefits conferred on our remote descendants would approach infinity.” This
would render CBA unworkable. “Because resources are limited, we couldn’t
make the expenditures called for by a cost-benefit analysis of catastrophic risks
that eschewed discounting to present value even if we wanted to.” POSNER,
supra note 145, at 152–53.
218. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1571 (citing WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 386–87 (6th ed.
1994); DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 357 (1984)).
219. When Judge Posner considers how to give weight to the welfare of
future generations, he finds the literature on the subject “immense but
inconclusive.” POSNER, supra note 145, at 153. This is critical if one agrees to the
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This calculation applies fairly to the risks to human life. We
use regulations to save lives and the environment in a much
shorter time frame. Discounting may then involve placing a value
on a statistical life.221 Economists’ measurements of that value
are often based on labor market data.222 What we do with that

application of CBA to risks of human extinction. In the context of using CBA to
cope with long-term societal risks, Judge Posner finds no best method of valuing
or weighing the needs of humanity’s future generations. How come? The logic of
discounting “breaks down when costs or benefits spread over a century or
longer. No individual will experience both the beginning and the end of the
transaction; no one is able to make the personal judgment that the trade-off is,
or is not, worthwhile.” ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 187. The
decision-making tool of discounting is lethal in the long term.
220. If, for some reason, humanity finds that it must use unrestricted CBA
to test regulations in order to avoid extinction, Richard Posner offers an
interesting approach that might help us save ourselves: negative discounting. If
the disaster that we consider is severe enough to make future generations
poorer than we are, rather than richer, that possibility might argue for using a
negative discount rate to determine the present value cost of the future disaster.
See POSNER, supra note 145, at 164–65. Posner assumes that we will make
future generations richer. Id. at 164. We are not obligated to make future
generations richer than ours, but we are obligated not to leave the next
generation starving, impoverished, and poisoned. If we can get to the point
where each of us leaves the world a better place, it would be wonderful. But that
is an aspiration, not an obligation.) Negative discounting emphasizes the future
and the long term over the present and the short term. Negative discounting
may be morally problematic. Is the cost of the future always too much? It may
be helpful to consider the circumstances when negative discounting could be
useful.
221. There is a substantial literature on the value of a statistical life. See,
e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Measuring the Value of a Statistical Life: Problems and
Prospects, 116 ECON. J. C10 (2006); Georges Dionne & Paul Lanoie, Public
Choice About the Value of a Statistical Life for Cost-Benefit Analyses: The Case
of Road Safety, 38 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL’Y 247 (2004); Louis R. Eeckhoudt
& James K. Hammitt, Background Risks and the Value of a Statistical Life, 23
J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 261 (2001); Per-Olov Johansson, Is There a Meaningful
Definition of the Value of a Statistical Life?, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 131 (2001);
Randall Lutter et al., The Cost-Per-Life-Saved Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing
Regulations, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 599 (1999); Sujitra Vassanadumrongdee &
Shunji Matsuoka, Risk Perceptions and Value of a Statistical Life for Air
Pollution and Traffic Accidents: Evidence from Bangkok, Thailand, 30 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 261 (2005); Viscusi, supra note 186.
222. W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 46–47 (1998). The use of labor
market data has problems. “[F]or incurring workplace hazards, white workers
get far more than African American workers do—a finding that seems to cast
doubt on government’s use of labor markets to produce a value for life.” Cass R.
Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 15, 2004),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books-and-arts/your-money-or-your-life
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value in discounting turns out to be problematic. According to law
professor Cass Sunstein, “human beings cannot be banked, and
they do not earn interest. In applying the usual discount rate for
money to human lives and environmental amenities, regulators
have not been sufficiently reflective.”223 When used in connection
with law and its regulation, CBA, in effect, discounts future
humans. This reflects a misalignment between our law and our
religious, moral, and intellectual heritages.
ii. Life Years
With public health considerations, a more complex matter is
at stake than the mere yes/no question of existence. As a result,
economists and theoreticians have developed measurements that
consider length and quality of life. The concept of the life year
was created to measure changes in average length of life. For
example, an increase or a decrease in the number of cancer cases
results in a shorter or a longer average life span.
These measurements have gotten amazingly precise. Not
only is there the concept of life years, there have been attempts at
refinement. One includes an effort at fairness. The notion of
equity-adjusted years of life saved (EYLS) has been developed.224
An early refinement in the 1970s involved the concept of qualityadjusted life years (QALYs).225
QALYs or other measures of life years are tools used to
evaluate the level of protection from risk in regulating against it.
Economists Paul Dolan & Jan Abel Olson explain the basis of the
QALY in relation to health care: “Since health is a function of
both length of life and quality of life, the ‘quality-adjusted life[http://perma.cc/7Y5K-93JY] (reviewing ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note
15) [hereinafter Your Money or Your Life].
223. Your Money or Your Life, supra note 222.
224. See Lars Lindholm et al., How Many Lives Is Equity Worth? A
Proposal for Equity Adjusted Years of Life Saved, 52 J. EPIDEMIOL COMMUNITY
HEALTH 808, 808–10 (1998) (“Under certain conditions, the Swedish politicians
are prepared to sacrifice 15 of 100 preventable deaths to achieve equity.”).
225. See Matthew D. Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New
Perspective, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 3 n.3 (2006) (citing Robert
M. Kaplan, Utility Assessment for Estimating Quality-Adjusted Life Years, in
VALUING HEALTH CARE: COSTS, BENEFITS, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF
PHARMACEUTICALS AND OTHER MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 31, 35 (Frank A. Sloan
ed., 1996)).
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year’ (QALY) has been developed in an attempt to combine the
value of these attributes into a single index number.”226 It would
seem that we can quantify any set of relative characteristics into
a unitary metric.
Such quantification may be problematic.227 Once we decide
what a QALY (or other life year) is worth, on average,228 across
the board, for humanity, we need to determine how many QALYs
are at risk. Then we can multiply. How many QALYs is all of
humanity worth? How much should we expend? To how much
effort should we go? In order to make those calculations, how
much should we discount future humans and the entire future of
life in order to arrive at a number for the benefit side of a costbenefit analysis?
Cambridge University Professor Martin Rees has an answer
to these questions: “The odds could be so heavily against the
emergence (and survival) of complex life that Earth is the unique
abode of conscious intelligence in our entire Galaxy. Our fate
would then have truly cosmic resonance.”229 In short, no dollar
value could ever be placed on all future human life. This
conclusion is consistent with the notion of sacred values,230 a
topic that merits further investigation elsewhere.
c. The Deficiencies of CBA
Even within the objective view of risk, purely economic views
or purely quantitative measures cannot effectively deal with
catastrophic risk at a global level. Traditional CBA is
226. Paul Dolan & Jan Abel Olson, Equity in Health: The Importance of
Different Health Streams, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 823, 823 (2001).
227. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 98–102, for a critical
analysis of the use of QALYs in health care.
228. In 2004, the common benchmark value was $50,000 per QALY in the
United States or £30,000 per QALY in the United Kingdom, although based on
published data those reference points may have been too low. See Christopher
Evans et al., Use of Quality Adjusted Life Years and Life Years Gained as
Benchmarks in Economic Evaluations: A Critical Appraisal, 7 HEALTH CARE
MGMT. SCI. 43, 43 (2004).
229. REES, supra note 97, at 157.
230. “Sacred values are ideals so transcendent that they have no equivalent
in anything material. People in all societies have them.” Sharon Begley, The Key
to Peace in the Mideast May be ‘Sacred Beliefs’, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2006),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115645687096244884
[perma.cc/9AZ7-DJUP]
(emphasis added).
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fundamentally flawed and can cause harm when we make
decisions of significance regarding human life. The deficiencies
are both practical and moral.
There are at least two practical inabilities: determining
probability and measuring benefit. Both the probabilities and
benefits are necessary to calculate responses to risk within
unrestricted CBA. Only with these figures can we determine the
cost we should reasonably incur.231
We cannot know the probabilities of our collective demise.
Without estimable probabilities, we cannot use costs to determine
benefits or vice versa. According to Judge Posner, when one
cannot assign probabilities and the risk is great, taking
appropriate action becomes a matter of choosing between two
extremes. It is like deciding to have surgery, all or nothing.232
There is no middle ground. When we consider the potential
tragedy caused by global warming, for example, too many
possible issues or variables are not subject to quantification or
measurement to make the necessary calculations using CBA.233
Humanity is left with what looks like a judgment call.
Extreme events confound standard methods of coping with
uncertainty. For example, since 2001 insurance companies have
terminated coverage for losses due to terrorism. And as “the end
of the world or the human race is not an insurable loss,” Judge
Posner correctly observes that insurance practices “[cannot] yield
useful information about the likelihood of extinction events.”234
Quantitative risk evaluation fails us in this extreme area.235
231. One would think that costs and benefits should be arrived at
independently and then compared. However, when we use CBA to protect from
risk, in simple terms, we place a value on what is being protected (the benefit),
and we may use a discount rate to discount that value if it is in the future. We
then calculate the probability of the risk. Finally, we multiply that probability
against the possibly-discounted value to arrive at the amount to expend to
protect against the risk (the cost). Ultimately, we need to know three figures:
cost, benefit and probability. In order to get there, we use the two figures we can
ascertain to triangulate the third.
232. POSNER, supra note 145, at 57–58.
233. As Judge Posner observes, “[N]o probabilities can be attached to the
catastrophic global warming-scenarios, and without an estimate of probability
an expected cost cannot be calculated.” Id. at 49–50.
234. Id. at 176.
235. Even using a substitute method of analysis known as “inverse costbenefit analysis” cannot help here. Inverse CBA calculates probability based on
government spending to prevent a risk and an estimated benefit. First, as the
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This consideration and others will force us out of a cost-benefit
view of risk and into considering other methods.
We can’t know the benefit of human existence, but for CBA
we need to arrive at a credible monetary value. Without a
measure of benefit,236 CBA cannot provide reliable guidance,237
and it should not be employed to regulate behavior.
Infinity is the first problem in measuring the benefit. If the
value of your life is infinite, it is immeasurable.238 To force a
measurement of value in advance of death is not only immoral, it
may be illegal. From the standpoint of criminal law, from the
general view of moral philosophy, and from the Abrahamic
religious tradition, trading lives for money should be illegal. But,
according to legal scholar Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, the discipline
of law and economics neglects this: “The question [is] whether our
society ought to be committed to preserving life at any cost;
whether the value of life (for purposes of the law) ought to be
infinite.”239
Even if the value of life is not an infinitely large number, it is
incalculable. The quantitative, techno-scientific approach to risk
assessment has not, to date, been able to fully calculate and

risk of human extinction is not currently on governmental radar, the amount of
spending to prevent human extinction does not provide any guidance
whatsoever. (Using CBA, expected cost (C) is the product of probability (P) and
loss (L): C=PL. Id. at 176–77. But now, to implement inverse CBA, cost must be
determined based on current expenditure. With matters of possible human
extinction, current cost C is either zero or unknown. Probability (P) is unknown.
The loss (L) is arguably infinite. Either zero C or infinite L will prevent us from
arriving at a probability. We have both. Thus, this approach to determining risk
is bound to fail.) Secondly, this approach to calculating probability is also
problematic in that government spending may not be based on risk at all but
solely upon politics.
236. Measuring the benefit is especially a problem in the face of possible
human extinction. As Richard Posner has observed, a surprisingly common
reaction to human extinction, if everyone dies all at once without warning, is
that “there is no loss,” “no ‘conscious pain and suffering’” from the perspective of
the tort lawyer. POSNER, supra note 145, at 170. This reflects one of the
limitations of the current economic perspective. It would seem that
foreseeability is not limited to everyone dying at once—or without warning.
237. See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1564.
238. By definition, infinity is unlimited, indefinite and immeasurable. See
WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 355 (rev. ed., 1996), for definitions of
infinity and infinite.
239. Gerner-Beuerle, supra note 193, at 1.
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consider the value of all of human life, present and future.240
Should one be able to place a dollar figure on human extinction?
How?241 There seems to be no rational decision-making in
attempting to measure the dollar value of something that is
morally repugnant. Even the rational secular-humanist
economist stops in his tracks when faced with these issues.
Without a quantified benefit or an estimate of probabilities, he
cannot arrive at a proper cost or amount to expend in order to
avoid the risk.242
By the way, there is yet another reason for inaccurate cost
calculations: Other agendas intrude, and so not even the costs of
the precautions are known or, maybe, knowable.243 For example,
240. Actually, Judge Posner placed a very rough dollar value on the
extinction of humanity. We are a bargain at only $600 trillion, a “minimum
estimate” achieved by doubling the population of the Earth to twelve billion to
account for at least some future for humanity and by valuing the average
individual life at a mere $50,000. POSNER, supra note 145, at 141, 165–71. This
is merely a crude estimate. A complex calculation may not be any more right.
Religious and moral leaders are likely to insist that money is irrelevant here.
241. Are we not priceless? See generally ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra
note 15. If we are priceless, it becomes impossible to measure the benefit when
lives are at risk. “Because important categories of benefits are priceless, costbenefit analysis in practice frequently turns out to be ‘complete cost-incomplete
benefit analysis.’” Id. at 207; see also GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT,
TRAGIC CHOICES 39 (1978), for the proposition that, to the extent that life is
beyond price, a refusal to save lives is horribly costly. Again, CBA is flawed for
the purpose of lifesaving.
242. “Postmodernism thrives because some are willing to believe that
where there is uncertainty, where propositions are not mathematically or
logically demonstrable, there can be no weighing of evidence, there can be no
truth.” James Gordley, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability
Before Pascal, 6 INT’L. J. EVID. & PROOF 191, 193 (2002) (book review). An
economic description of the “principles underlying postmodernization” includes
“the appeal to unadorned market relations, the erosion of the state as a source of
dependence, the weakening of workplace solidarities and the elevation of the
private over the public in matters of cultural and social provision.” Christopher
Stanley, Repression and Resistance: Problems of Regulation in Contemporary
Urban Culture, 21 INT’L. J. SOC. L. 23, 30 (1993). Postmodernism in the form of
CBA fails in the face of possible human extinction.
243. The subjectivity of CBA, its limited view, reflects the perspective of the
economist designing the model. Even though traditional CBA falls within the
objective view of risk, it invokes subjective preferences. Thus, despite its
quantitative veneer, CBA is no more transparent than any other subjective way
of viewing risk. This is because its unitary metric is morally incomparable to the
loss of life. Keating, supra note 20, at 680–81. Traditional CBA obscures this
subjective decision-making and lends itself well to reducing public debate.
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1578. Thus, CBA, which prides itself
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when industry testifies about the costs of proposed regulations,
those costs are often inflated; industry has, in some cases,
estimated costs to be twice the actual costs.244 It is difficult to be
precise when those who know the most about the inputs may be
obfuscating. Even when it comes to studies commissioned by the
government, the costs of regulation may not be accurately
portrayed.245 Ultimately, even the costs of regulation may not be
fully calculable, and those costs may not matter as much as the
significant risks to fundamental rights addressed by regulation.
Our view of risk informs our decision-making processes and
helps us analyze choices we face. However, when infinite amounts
of money cannot begin to compensate for decisions that involve
enormous downside risks, CBA bares its lack of a moral
component. CBA is blind to risk, and is thereby rendered not only
irrelevant but dangerous.
CBA even fails in the face of moral norms. The mindset of the
cost-benefit analyst seems foreign to most of us.246 The thinking
seems foreign because it is morally wrong to hide behind the
“objectivity” of CBA while turning lives into dollars in an attempt
to maximize profits or efficiency. Implicit subjectivity in CBA
reveals to us the little man behind this strange and mystical
curtain. We will encounter problems of implicit subjectivity with
discounting as well.
on being scientific, quantifiable, and objective (which should be more
transparent), not only fails to accurately measure risk, it helps to obscure risk.
244. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1580 (citing Eban
Goodstein & Hart Hodges, Polluted Data: Overestimating Environmental Costs,
35 AMER. PROSPECT 64, 64 (1997)); see also Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth
Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation,
80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998–99 (2002).
245. Consider the 2010 study commissioned by the Office of Advocacy of the
U.S. Small Business Administration which arrived at a $1.75 trillion annual
cost of regulation. Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The $1.75 Trillion Lie, 1
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 127, 128–29 (2012).
246. Ackerman and Heinzerling compare the thinking behind VSL to
everyday life:
Most religions tell us that every human life is sacred; it is obviously
illegal, as well as immoral, to buy and sell human lives. Most
parents tell their children to eat their vegetables and do their
homework, even though the rewards of these onerous activities lie
far in the future. Monetizing human lives and discounting future
benefits seem at odds with these common perspectives.
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1563.
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There is a deeper issue of moral limits here. Should
humanity decide to place limits on practices that harm or even
kill people? What limits should humanity use to protect life? For
now, let us put three more nails in the coffin of CBA — moral
unfairness and incommensurability, practical flaws of
discounting, and the immorality of maximizing income in the face
of catastrophic risk — and then wrap up the objective view with a
visit to well-being analysis.
i. Moral Fairness and
Incommensurability
Beyond the problem of infinity and other problems of
measurement, CBA has a moral fairness problem.247
The
comparability problem, or more precisely, the commensurability
problem, underlies unrestricted cost-benefit analysis: Dying is
different from buying. Gregory Keating explains that the value
system implicit in CBA “treats all human interests—urgent ones
like adequate nutrition and physical integrity and luxuries like
the consumption of fine wines—as fungible at some ratio of
exchange.”248 What’s more, CBA “insists that the cost-justified
level of precaution is the only level of precaution that is ever
justified. More stringent precaution simply squanders
resources.”249 CBA considers precautions ultimately proven
unnecessary to have been thrown away or wasted.250 However,

247. When we care about risk, we find that “the economic interpretation [of
reasonable care] is not innocuous when it comes to fixing the appropriate
measure of precaution when life itself is at stake.” Keating, supra note 20, at
656.
248. Id.
249. Id. “Our common law of negligence, by contrast, treats the physical
integrity of the person as an especially urgent interest, and our juries are
repulsed by the claim that accidental deaths should not be prevented whenever
the costs of prevention exceed the value—economically conceived—of the lives at
risk.” Id. at 656. There is a sense of fairness. “Fairness, in the sense that
concerns us, is inherently relational and interpersonal: What kinds of gains to
some are sufficiently important to justify inflicting accidental death on others?”
Id. at 668. For that matter, what kinds of gains to some are sufficiently
important to justify taking on the significant risk of inflicting accidental death
on all of us?
250. Connected with this, assumptions (in neo-classical economics) in favor
of efficiency and maximization help demand or even require consumption.
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resources used for precaution are not necessarily squandered;
there is a special value involved in protecting life.
Natural resources that are not used are not necessarily
squandered either. Personal preferences don’t always lean toward
consumption. As it downgrades the future,251 CBA may not
comport with the reality of human decision-making. We may
prefer the future by conserving and saving.252 We have much
more latitude and choice than CBA permits, and it appears that
humanity will need the extra range of choice. Assumptions about
the timing of our needs involve risk and need to involve notions of
moral fairness.
CBA and neoclassical economics fail to account for issues of
fairness (justice or equity). Neo-classical economics may bestow
the same fairness considerations as employed by typical five-yearolds,253 but worse, it actually treats humanity as sociopathic.254
It teaches us to maximize and thus to act unfairly.255 This
unfairness, due to commercial society’s limited view of the costs,
benefits, and externalities, is arguably immoral.256
Can
economics ultimately find a way to account for fairness? This is

251. “Cost-benefit analysis systematically downgrades the importance of
the future in two ways: through the technique of discounting and through
predictive methodologies that take inadequate account of the possibility of
catastrophic and irreversible events.” Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16,
at 1571.
252. Ackerman and Heinzerling find Americans to be very different as
citizens than as consumers: “The tension between Americans’ personal saving
habits and their enthusiasm for Social Security implies a sharp divergence
between the temporal preferences of people as consumers and as citizens.” Id. at
1573.
253. See Yoella Bereby-Meyer & Shelly Fiks, Changes in Negative
Reciprocity as a Function of Age, 26 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 397, 401–02 (2013).
254. See Mixon, supra note 2, at 329–36 (citing Lynn A. Stout, Taking
Conscience Seriously, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE
ECONOMY 157, 159 (Paul Zak ed., 2008)). “[H]omo economicus is a sociopath. The
hallmark of sociopathy is extreme selfishness as shown by a willingness ‘to lie,
cheat, take advantage [and] exploit.’” Stout, supra, at 158–59 (citing BENJAMIN
J. WOLMAN, THE SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITY 42 (1987)). Sociopaths, who learn to
be bad, are to be contrasted with psychopaths, who are born bad. See Mixon,
supra note 2, at 330–32.
255. We are taught to maximize the benefit to ourselves without regard to
effects on others.
256. See PAUL HEYNE, “ARE ECONOMISTS BASICALLY IMMORAL?” AND OTHER
ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND RELIGION 1 ((Geoffrey Brennan & A.M.C. Waterman
Eds., 2008).
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important, for when weighing lives, CBA’s fairness problem runs
even deeper.
CBA relies on measuring and weighing. Due to the
exponential power of discounting, large future risks may appear
to be quite small—and thus CBA measures merely a tiny benefit
in precaution. In observing shortsighted choices leading to
environmental devastation and death from preventable causes,
Ackerman and Heinzerling ask, “How can bizarre, hypothetical
calculations about tiny sums of money stand in the way of using
our knowledge and resources to do the right thing?”257 Beautiful
question.
These preferences, upon which we rely to make our decisions
in CBA, may be transient. We construct them anew each time,258
either individually, or in groups.259 If we are not careful, we
could build systems of law upon fleeting values and views using
CBA.260 If that happens, once the views erode from under it, the
law is floating on air without foundation. It seems possible that
the law could contribute to collapse. We must work to find a more
solid touchstone to help us systematize law and help humanity
protect itself.
Moral considerations, not CBA, are more likely to help us
decide whether to preserve or consume. When I start to develop
this below,261 we will encounter possible reconnections between
economics and morality and ultimately between law and
morality.
All too easily, humanity can mislead itself by how it frames
its choices between preservation and consumption. Surveying and
257. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 223.
258. See Dan Simon et al., The Transience of Constructed Preferences, 21 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 11 (2008).
259. There is a connection between the way humans act individually and
the way we act in groups. We each share the same biochemical “wiring,” many of
the same responses to stimuli. There are probably variants at each end of a bell
curve reflecting various tendencies, for individuals and for groups, but the bulk
will be in the same general range.
260. Paul Heyne considers economists’ view and use of values and
incentives: “The good economist is often perceived as immoral because he is
suspicious of what Adam Smith called the ‘man of system’ who in his own
conceit supposes that the members of a great society can be moved about as
easily as the hand moves the pieces on a chessboard.” HEYNE, supra note 256, at
8.
261. See infra Section III(C)(2).
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sampling of preferences and economic modeling have blind
spots.262 Willingness to pay fails to capture the significance of
the issue of preservation.263 As Cass Sunstein rightly states, in
the face of functionally irreversible choices, “it is obtuse to think
that public health, wildlife or pristine areas are valued in the
same way as their cash equivalents. Anyone who believed in such
equivalence would have an unrecognizable understanding of how
health, wildlife and pristine areas are properly appreciated and
experienced.”264 We place special values on health and life.
Consider your own.
To Ackerman and Heinzerling, the prime deficiency of
unrestricted CBA is that it places no special value on health or
life.265 By forcing everything to be rendered into comparable
terms of prices and values, those who support traditional CBA
come up with astounding notions such as weighing whether it is
cheaper for citizens to kill themselves than it is to provide them
with nursing home care and other expensive services related to
their aging.266 The cost savings represent money, and that
262. For example, the consumption preferences of individuals can be
misleading:
In a classic example of this distinction [between valuing the
environment as a consumer and doing so as an expression of public
values as a citizen], the philosopher Mark Sagoff found that his
students, in their role as citizens, opposed commercial ski
development in a nearby wilderness area, but, in their role as
consumers, would plan to go skiing there if the development were
built. There is no contradiction between these two views; as
individual consumers, the students would have no way to express
their collective preference for wilderness preservation. Their
individual willingness to pay for skiing would send a misleading
signal about their views as citizens.
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1566–67 (citing MARK SAGOFF, THE
ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 50–53 (1988)).
263. The increased production and consumption associated with CBA does
not necessarily translate into increased welfare. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH,
THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 131, 145 (1960).
264. Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 227, 244
(2010) [hereinafter Irreversibility].
265. “[Economic analysts] have blurred the line between risks and actual
deaths, by calculating the value of the reduced risk while pretending that they
have produced a valuation of life itself. The paradox of monetizing the infinite or
immeasurable value of human life has not been resolved; it has only been
glossed over.” Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1565–66.
266. A study, by then-Harvard economist W. Kip Viscusi, concluded “that
states, in fact, saved money as a result of smoking by their citizens. Why?
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money carries with it a right. Someone has a right to it. That
right is a property right. This is an example of the property right
in CBA being placed on a par with life itself.
Senior citizens are not alone in having their lives devalued.
CBA gives children the same treatment, only worse, by
measuring the value of the time saved by hurried parents’ failure
to properly fasten their child’s safety seat. By that estimate, a
child’s life is worth only $500,000.267 Is a moment of hurried
inconvenience worth the risk of loss of a child’s life? Unrestricted
CBA would say so.268 Our accident laws would say not. Criminal
laws would object with an even stronger statement of our values.
Why should economists be allowed this latitude? The root of
Western law is based on moral values, not on economics.
Treating diverse human needs alike is unfair. It is unfair to
those who are at risk of death, and all of us seem to bear that risk
to some degree. CBA’s version of risk analysis weighs risk against
calculations of maximum efficiency.269 Unrestricted CBA tries to
Because they died early!” Id. at 1553–54. States avoided the expenses of an
aging population. “So great, under Viscusi’s assumptions, were the financial
benefits to the states of their citizens’ premature deaths that, he suggested,
‘cigarette smoking should be subsidized rather than taxed.’” Id. (quoting W. Kip
Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking 47 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 4891, 1994), http://papers.nber.org/
papers/w4891.pdf [http://perma.cc/8397-LUXK]).
267. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1555–56 (citing Paul S.
Carlin & Robert Sandy, Estimating the Implicit Value of a Child’s Life, 58 S.
ECON. J. 186 (1991)).
268. For more examples of the strange and risky results of discounting in
the context of CBA, see ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 179–203.
269. Ultimately economists arrive at a single metric, some unit of currency,
to equate the value of life with principles of efficiency maximization or wealth
maximization. Per Carsten Gerner-Beuerle:
[T]he attempt to calculate the value of life constitutes a rather
dangerous undertaking. It qualifies what should arguably not be
qualified and calls into question the appropriateness of protective,
lifesaving measures (because they might be cost-inefficient). Every
theory to address legal issues should be coherent. A consequent
application of the principle of wealth maximisation to cases involving
risks to human life would, however, yield results that are, on their
face, contradictory to common perceptions of justice. Assume the
following example: A miner has been trapped after an explosion in a
mine. To rescue him would necessitate extensive excavation, which
would cost €2.5 mill. Assuming that life is valued at €2 mill. (as
scholars in, for example, Germany suggest), it would not be costefficient to rescue the miner. The resources could be put to a better,
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wring out every last benefit, even the most trivial one, right up to
the perceived edge of risk, ex ante, before the fact. The competing
considerations (trivial benefits vs. devastating injury) are not
The attempt to measure and compare the
comparable.270
incommensurable leads us to take risk, even for small gain, until
there is no room for error—no room for normal or foreseeable
variance.
Certainly, trivial benefits even spread generously today
cannot begin to compensate for the loss of millions, or even
billions of lives tomorrow or even thirty years from now. Although
in a sense the issue is incommensurability, in another sense the
issue runs deeper. Look in the mirror. Even if your current
benefits are not trivial,271 ask yourself: Are significant risks to
the lives and health of others worth it? Is it fair? Keating points
out that “[d]evastating injury presents special problems of
fairness, both because devastating injuries are especially severe
and because they cannot be repaired ex post.” Consequently,
“[t]he fair treatment of risks of devastating injury requires that
we take more than cost-justified precaution against their
occurrence.”272 If we are all at risk, the solution must also be
equitable and moral.
Ackerman and Heinzerling contend that there is an “intrinsic
conflict between cost-benefit analysis and the principles of
to a wealth-maximising use. Should they, consequently, not be
invested? The answer is as everybody, presumably also proponents
of the approach outlined above, would agree: of course they should be
invested in rescuing the miner.
Gerner-Beuerle, supra note 193, at 6.
270. “The mistake [in CBA] lies not in undervaluing life or health. The
mistake lies in assuming that trivial benefits and devastating losses are
comparable. They are not, and it is unfair to treat them as if they are.” Keating,
supra note 20, at 660; see also id. at 664–74.
271. Keating notes:
In a world of distinct persons who affirm diverse and
incommensurable conceptions of the ends worth pursuing over the
course of a human life, there is no reason to assume that those who
are put at risk value the ends pursued through the relevant risk
impositions in a way that those imposing the risks do. The fact that
you are prepared to run enormous risks for the advancement of
medical knowledge does not mean that I am prepared to do so.
Id. at 678. May few insist on exercising liberties reasonably foreseeable to
impose significant risks on all.
272. Id. at 746.
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fairness that animate, or should animate, our national policy
toward protecting people from being hurt by other people.”
Therefore, “the results of cost-benefit analysis cannot simply be
‘given some weight’ along with other factors, without
undermining the fundamental equality of all citizens — rich and
poor, young and old, healthy and sick.”273 The subjective view in
CBA that our efficient economy is worth more than the lives of
some of our citizens—and many aliens274—is dead wrong.
ii. Practical Flaws of Discounting
Although I have discussed theoretical problems implicit in
discounting above, from a practical standpoint, it is possible to
also see fatal flaws in the practice of discounting. At best, the
discount rate is chosen by the economist based on the perceived
length of time between cost and benefit.275 At worst, the
economist shoots from the hip—or holds firmly to an arbitrarilyselected number.276 Then costs, benefits, and probabilities are
estimated. At best, the numbers get calculated with great
precision but little if any accuracy as to the underlying issue.277
273. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1584.
274. The United States routinely values foreign lives at zero, by failing to
consider them in decisions to regulate. See Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler,
Valuing Foreign Lives, 48 GA. L. REV. 499, 526, 528 (2014). That failure
“massively understates even the domestic benefit of protecting those lives.” Id.
at 559 (citing David Dana, Valuing Foreign Lives and Settlements, J. BENEFITCOST ANALYSIS, July 2010, art 4, at 22). And it even more massively understates
the justice implicit in protecting them.
275. See Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Should Moral Sentiments Be Incorporated
into Benefit-Cost Analysis? An Example of Long-Term Discounting, 37 POL’Y SCI.
305 (2004).
276. In 2004, economists used “a standard ‘discount rate’ (about 7 percent
annually) to convert future dollars into current equivalents.” Your Money or
Your Life, supra note 222. “With a 7 percent discount rate . . . $1000 in twenty
years is worth only $260 today.” Id. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget
has also embraced a seven percent discount rate as part of its regulatory review.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-94,
GUIDELINES AND DISCOUNT RATES FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL
PROGRAMS 7 (1992).
277. Precision is only as good as the quality of the inputs. Relevant quality
data is scarce:
Often, the only regulatory benefit that can be quantified is the
prevention of cancer, yet cancer has a latency period of between five
and forty years. When discounted at five percent, a cancer death
forty years from now has a ‘present value’ of only one-seventh of a
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In the face of significant risk, such lack of accuracy could be quite
harmful.
Even Judge Richard Posner, a long-time proponent of CBA,
sees the shortcomings of discounting in protecting against
catastrophic loss. In considering the diversion of money to solve
global warming within this century, he observed that
“discounting future to present values is not a method of helping
people to decide how to manage their affairs in the way most
conducive to maximizing their welfare. Rather it is a method of
maximizing global wealth without regard to its distribution
among persons.”278 Society maximizes wealth through use and
consumption, because we make more money when we use
resources.
Discounting helps maximize current wealth, but it does not
protect us from risk. As Ackerman and Heinzerling point out,
discounting society’s most profound values represents a “new
mathematics of impatience” which “endorses profligacy and shuns
discipline.”279 In a way, discounting helps us act more like
teenagers.
Discounting itself is asymmetrically skewed. In this article,
health and environmental losses are the concern. Losses,
including those to the environment and especially to health, get
discounted more than gains, financial or otherwise.280 This
aspect of discounting requires either countervailing measures or
the abandonment of discounting in favor of an entirely different
approach.
Discounting does not give us guidance regarding how to deal
with risks of possible human extinction. It clouds our view of the
risks by distracting us with lucre. If, in any way, the death of one
death today. Thus, one of the benefits that most often can be
quantified—allowing it to be folded into cost-benefit analysis—is also
one that is heavily discounted, making the benefits of preventative
regulation seem trivial.
Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1579. If this is one of the best
examples of what CBA and discounting can do together, imagine the worst.
Extrapolated from the individual context, we see the problem with using CBA
together with discounting to protect humanity from extinction or from inflicting
significant self-harm.
278. POSNER, supra note 145, at 152.
279. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 203.
280. See David J. Hardisty & Elke U. Weber, Discounting Future Green:
Money vs. the Environment, 138 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 329, 329 (2009).
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person can equate to a billion deaths, even hundreds of years
from now, in the words of philosopher Derek Parfit, “catastrophes
in the further future can . . . be regarded as morally trivial.”281
We lose sight of the risk, and we throw away the future.

iii. Maximizing Income in the Face of
Catastrophic Risk
The above title brings to mind the creature that stayed on
the road, eating, for a second too long. This section is about the
problems implicit in maximizing income all the way to the edge of
foreseeable significant risk.
The assumptions, framing,282 and tools (e.g., discounting) of
neo-classical economics and cost-benefit analysis are geared to
help achieve that maximization.
From the beginning, economists are trained to maximize
gains in the face of risk. And although they ostensibly attempt to
avoid ethical and moral judgments,283 law professor John Mixon
correctly observes a pattern of contrary behavior in the education
of economists: by teaching students to maximize and thus to act
unfairly, neoclassical micro-economics courses not only treat
psychopathic or sociopathic behavior as normal,284 they present
the underlying assumptions as factual and scientific;285 they
assume players in the amoral market are amoral;286 they portray
government as the enemy;287 and ultimately, they encourage
students to turn their backs on community values.288 As a result
of this training, students’ moral structures may be altered,289
such neo-classical fundamentalism may be absorbed by students
as religion,290 and that may produce sociopaths.291 According to
281. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 357 (1984).
282. The emphasis and the framing in neo-classical economics tends to be
short-term rather than long-term. See infra Section III(C)(1)(b)(i).
283. See Mixon, supra note 2, at 344–47.
284. Id. at 342.
285. Id. at 344–48.
286. Id. at 348–50.
287. Id. at 350–52.
288. Id. at 352–53.
289. Mixon, supra note 2, at 353–56.
290. Id. at 356–57.
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economist Charles Clark, “the problems we face in our economic
system stem from the values upon which neoclassical economic
theory is constructed.”292 As Clark sees it, “[t]hese values are
contrary to the true nature of the person and of the just society,
and the theories which have been built upon them have become a
barrier to a better understanding of our economic system.”293
As a result, humanity has become a means [to income and
wealth], not an end. In the process, some have become roadkill.
The direct impact on humanity merely represents a larger
problem. The failure to protect life holds an ominous message for
the human future.
If we were to consider significant risk in science itself,294 in
biodiversity loss, in land use, in resource depletion, in pollution,
in climate change, and in a possible environmental avalanche,295
we would see that many of the problems in our economic systems
are the same ones we face environmentally. Aside from shortterm oscillations, demand is outstripping supply on our overcrowded and increasingly competitive Earth. The neo-classical
economist merely sees the problems from the other side, from the
standpoint of consumption rather than from the standpoint of
preservation and long-term need.
CBA relies on the neo-classical concept of societal income
maximization: Maximum income is maximum efficiency; anything
less is irrational.296 By wringing every penny out of a risky
situation, the exercise of CBA assumes that it is best to maximize
our collective income (overall efficiency).297 Such maximization is
291. Id. at 357–65.
292. Charles M.A. Clark, Competing Visions: Equity and Efficiency in the
Firm, in RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS: INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS FROM
THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION 81, 83 (S.A. Cortright & Michael J. Naughton
eds., 2002).
293. Id.
294. See REES, supra note 97, at 73–88.
295. See supra Section II(A).
296. See supra note 191; see also supra Section III(C)(1)(a)(ii).
297. Neo-classical economics deludes itself and attempts to do so for the
rest of us:
Economists like to believe that their discipline, at least at the
theoretical level, is a positive science, that it contains no value
judgments. Whenever values or value judgments are admitted,
economics becomes normative economics, and here we typically find
discussions of specific policy goals. But almost all economists would
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a system of selfishness. It is sufficient to be harmful; harmful
selfishness is greed, especially if it is intentional.298 CBA is based
on greed299 in the name of efficiency. Greed is then the basis for
curtailing precaution at the point of cost-justification.300
Although some might think that should work for some business
decisions, it is not a model for conducting life. Using unrestricted
CBA to make life or death decisions places greed-based efficiency
on a par with life itself. For that reason, when applying CBA to
regulatory decisions involving significant risk of death or injury,
CBA in its pure and most characteristic form, whether formal or

contend that in terms of economic theory itself, values play no role,
that like the natural sciences, economic theory considers only the
facts as we find them in nature. This positive-normative distinction
in economics has never stood up to philosophical scrutiny, for, as
Gunnar Myrdal has convincingly argued, every aspect of economic
theory is normative, that is, reflects values and value judgments.
Clark, supra note 292, at 84 (citing GUNNAR MYRDAL, POLITICAL ELEMENT IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC THEORY (1954); GUNNAR MYRDAL, VALUE IN SOCIAL
THEORY (1958)). The primary value judgment of neo-classical economics seems
to be greed. Other conceptions include “what human nature entails, and,
indeed, . . . the real and ideal order of society.” Id.
298. Gross negligence may be sufficient.
299. Packaged as prosperity rather than greed, the notion seems much more
acceptable. Unfortunately, either way, based on humanity’s position, speed, and
trajectory, the result is excessive consumption, excessive pollution, and
excessive risk of significant harm.
300. An example provided by Keating uses a hypothetical accident and
compares the dollar value of a television technician’s life against the greater
dollar value of the inconvenience of a billion people who would miss the weekly
broadcast of Baywatch were the technician’s life to be saved.
No amount of inconvenience—distributed across a large number of
distinct persons—sums to the loss of a single life. We therefore
should not decide how to proceed by measuring the victim’s
preference for having her life saved in the dollars that she would pay
to save it and by comparing the sum to the dollars that the views
would pay to have the broadcast continue. The cost to the technician
and the benefit to the viewers are not fungible at some ratio of
exchange.
Keating, supra note 20, at 666. To equate a life with dollars ex ante, before the
loss, is as wrong in economics as it is in other modes of thought. This is
recognized in the moral foundations of our laws. See Hershey H. Friedman &
Linda Weiser Friedman, Is Greed Good? Lessons About Moral Leadership from
Psalm
72
(July
16,
2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2467294
[https://perma.cc/3QUN-8TK8] (lamenting American political and business
leaders’ selfishness as being like that of ancient Israel’s King Solomon).
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informal,301 is morally corrupt. Consider the example of fenced
elephant herds with no reproductive limits that consume and
destroy their food source to the point of starvation.302 Greed
alone can kill.
CBA is a tool used by humans. However, its effect is to use
the health or the life of another statistically random human being
as a means, a means to maximize income, efficiency, and wealth.
The lives of others become expendable.
Either way, individually or collectively, as was observed in
the war crime trials at Nuremburg,303 it is immoral to use human
life as a means. They can be individuals or statistical groups of
twenty or 100, but those statistics turn out to be real: they live
with autism, or they suffer other adverse health effects from the
selfish decisions we make. Those unconsenting statistical people
and the beneficiaries of the decisions are unlikely to realize
exactly what has happened, but the people who pay with life or
health have been a means for the beneficiaries to accrue their
gains.304
This happens through maximization. Maximizing utility,
maximizing income, maximizing consumption, or maximizing

301. See Amy Sinden, Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis,
2015 UTAH L. REV. 93, 172 (addressing the difference between formal and
informal CBA).
302. DAVID P. BARASH, THE SURVIVAL GAME: HOW GAME THEORY EXPLAINS
THE BIOLOGY OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 123 (2003).
303. 5 Int’l Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the
International Military Tribunal: Proceedings 9 January 1946 – 21 January
1946, 408 (Jan. 17, 1946) (statement of M. François de Menthon).
[The nature of man] is defined in two complementary ideas: The
dignity of the human being considered in each and every person
individually, on the one hand; and on the other hand, the
permanence of the human being considered within the whole of
humanity. Every juridical organization of the human being in a state
of civilization proceeds from this essential, two-fold conception of the
individual, in each and all, the individual and the universal. . . . .It is
a general conception which imposes itself quite naturally on the
spirit: It was professed since ancient pre-Christian times; and in
more recent times, the great German philosopher Kant expressed it
in one of his most forceful formulas, by saying that a human being
should always be considered as an end and never a means.
Id.
304. To make matters worse, given current foreseeable and significant
environmental risks, we could all become a means.
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wealth,305 as assumed by neo-classical economics and CBA, are
misguided, in that no single person reaps all the benefits or bears
all of the burdens of a social practice.306 When we cumulate the
costs and the benefits, according to Gregory Keating, the sum of
benefits, minus burdens, is “an unreliable guide to the actual
gains and losses of the persons affected by the practice.”307 This
is especially the case when loss means death.
The benefits alone can be problematic. If we sum the
benefits, with an increasing population, philosopher John Rawls
observes that we can get an unjustifiable result:
[W]hen population is subject to change . . . [the principle of
maximizing total utility] . . . entails that so long as the average
utility per person falls slowly enough when the number of
individuals increases, the population should be encouraged to
grow indefinitely no matter how low the average has fallen . . .
the sum of utilities added by the greater number of persons is
sufficiently great to make up for the decline in the share per
capita. As a matter of justice . . . a very low average of well-being
may be required.308

The benefits may be tiny yet the potentially catastrophic
losses may justify curbing the benefit prior to maximization,
ahead of the risk.
If we consider human population and its impact on earth and
the environment, we would see that the quantitative approach
based on the sum of utilities,309 may ultimately destroy the
305. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980)
(advocating a system of wealth maximization).
306. One might wonder whether some externalities might be inherent in
CBA.
307. Keating, supra note 20, at 671.
308. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 140 (rev. ed. 1999).
309. “What is the good in a world swarming with people having lives barely
worth living, even if overall the aggregation of the ‘utility’ of its members
supersedes that of any alternative, smaller world?” DAVID HEYD, GENETHICS:
MORAL ISSUES IN THE CREATION OF PEOPLE 57 (1992). The classical utilitarianism
of Jeremy Bentham is an example of a principle that implies the “repugnant
conclusion,” PARFIT, supra note 281, by recommending the creation of a large
population in which each person is poverty-stricken. But Garrett Hardin finds
that other liberty considerations, qualitative in nature, also rule out the goal:
If our goal is to maximize population it is obvious what we must do:
We must make the work calories per person approach as close to zero
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qualitative approach which looks at the quality of one person’s
existence. There may be too much quantity (of people) to allow for
quality (of life)—or for the avoidance of death or even extinction.
The sum of the benefits is a risky approach to decision making.
Our greed, our selfish interest in finding, capturing, and
measuring a maximum quantitative benefit, causes us to lose
sight of unrestricted CBA’s qualitative impact. Reliance on
unrestricted CBA, even if done as “risk avoidance,”310 runs us
into serious problems in the qualitative arena. We need other
tools for the risks of today and tomorrow.
The hazards facing humanity are just too great. New risks,
never before considered await us. CBA cannot measure, value,
weigh, or otherwise assist with risks of new technology. It lacks
both a vision of risk and an appropriate weighing mechanism.
CBA’s purpose is not to protect us. With new hazards, we need
tools that align properly with risk. By sociologist Ulrich Beck’s
analysis of the problem,311 the risk calculus of the past, alone,
as possible. No gourmet meals, no vacations, no sports, no music, no
literature, no art. . . . I think that everyone will grant, without
argument or proof, that maximizing population does not maximize
goods. Bentham’s goal is impossible.
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243–44 (1968).
310. Risk avoidance can be perilous.
We need as a society to develop a mode of analysis that does not
obscure what is at stake and for whom. We need to frame the debate
so that it considers the larger question of whether a given risk and
its attendant possibilities for avoidance are morally, culturally, and
socially acceptable. In the end, we need to reflect upon the very basic
question of whether this is the direction we wish to take
environmental law and policy: Whether we wish to shape a world in
which our children can no longer make mud pies.
Catherine A. O’Neill, No Mud Pies: Risk Avoidance as Risk Regulation, 31 VT. L.
REV. 273, 354 (2007).
311. BECK, supra note 19, at 53–54.
[N]uclear, chemical, genetic, and ecological mega-hazards abolish the
four pillars of the calculus of risks. First, one is concerned here with
global, often irreparable, damage that can no longer be limited; the
concept of monetary compensation therefore fails. Second,
precautionary after-care is excluded for the worst imaginable
accident in the case of fatal hazards; the security concept of
anticipatory monitoring of results fails. Third, the ‘accident’ loses its
delimitations in time and space, and therefore its meaning. It
becomes an event with a beginning and no end; an ‘open-ended
festival’ of creeping, galloping and overlapping waves of destruction.
But that implies: standards of normality, measuring procedures and
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cannot begin to reflect the realities and the extreme risks of the
future. We will need to employ a new flexibility that considers a
wide view of significant risks.
However, we face an economic argument “that it is irrational
to press precaution beyond the point of cost-justification—because
doing so will make everyone worse off.”312 To Gregory Keating,
the argument “rests on both an inadequate metric of
interpersonal comparison and insufficient attention to the actual
distribution of burdens and benefits.”313 Here is the flaw in the
metric of comparison: “it treats the devastation of some[, let alone
all,] as comparable to the receipt of trivial benefits by others—
even though the two are not morally comparable.”314 The
burdens and the benefits are disconnected,315 and “the economic
surplus realized by taking only cost-justified precaution cannot be
used to restore the lives or the health of those devastated by costjustified risks. . . . [D]eath and devastation are beyond
rectification by redistribution.”316 For the weak and unlucky,
there is no chance of recovery. In effect, our economic system is
harming and killing people in the interest of gain. We should
reject the neo-classical economic argument.
In the view of Professors Ackerman and Heinzerling, for
purposes of risk regulation, CBA should be rejected in its
entirety, and we should look elsewhere: “Cost-benefit analysis
cannot overcome its fatal flaw: it is completely reliant on the
impossible attempt to price the priceless values of life, health,
nature, and the future”; instead, they say, “Better public policy
decisions can be made without cost-benefit analysis, by combining
the successes of traditional regulation with the best of the
innovative and flexible approaches that have gained ground in
recent years.”317 They are correct. We will examine some of those

therefore the basis for calculating the hazards are abolished;
incomparable entities are compared and calculations turn into
obfuscation.
Id.; see id. at 50–52 for a description of the four pillars of the calculus of risks.
312. Keating, supra note 20, at 673.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. This disconnection is the cost externalization problem.
316. Keating, supra note 20, at 673.
317. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1584.
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alternative approaches when we consider the Moral View of
Risk.318
Enormous risks that go with life and death decisions may be
better answered with a simple (but appropriate) “better safe than
sorry.” While flexibility and a variety of views and possible
responses increase the number and range of tools available to us
to cope with risk, some risks—and some dangers—rise to the
level of requiring special treatment. The greater the risk to
human life, either individually or collectively, the less money
matters—and the less important are the costs,319 whatever they
may be, to save us from collapse or extinction.
d. Well-Being Analysis and its Deficiencies
Why not use Well-Being Analysis (WBA) to measure
individual satisfaction instead of using CBA to measure dollars?
WBA is a decision tool based on measurements of satisfaction or
happiness using ranking of preferences,320 another unitary
metric. Some view WBA as the next step in risk analysis and
decision procedure. As Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and
Masur tell it, WBA solves many of the problems of CBA.321 In
many ways they are correct. WBA happens also to be the subject
of an exhaustively detailed book by Matthew Adler.322 WBA is
quite a step forward, and it would be a huge advance if humanity
318. See infra Section III(C)(2).
319. A higher marginal utility of consumption (leading to an increase in
consumption) at the end of life is replicated at the individual level. Lee A.
Lillard & Yoram Weiss, Uncertain Health and Survival: Effects on End-of-Life
Consumption, 15 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 254, 254 (1997). Now, let’s say our
collective risk grows significantly. If there is a statistically significant effect
from the pending death of one person, imagine if it is magnified by billions. The
effect of the resultant increase in consumption might be enough to significantly
increase risk in and of itself. We need to learn to tread more lightly.
320. MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND EQUITY: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 32–36 (2012).
321. See JOHN BRONSTEEN ET AL., HAPPINESS AND THE LAW 59–92 (2015);
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, & Masur, supra note 155, at 1689.
322. ADLER, supra note 320; Daniel M. Hausman, Well-Being and Fair
Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, 28 ECON. & PHIL. 435 (2012) (book
review) (providing a general overview of Adler’s book); Mark Sagoff, Matthew D.
Adler, Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis, NOTRE
DAME PHILOSOPHICAL REV., (Dec. 4, 2012), http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/36051-wellbeing-and-fair-distribution-beyond-cost-benefit-analysis/ [http://perma.cc/Y9SJ77LG] (book review).
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was not already in a very difficult situation with too much
consumption, pollution, and population.
Unfortunately, WBA does not reach or employ the necessary
decision tools. Like unrestricted CBA, WBA is utilitarian in
nature. And as with CBA, the theory focuses with a unitary
metric,323 measuring the subjective well-being of single
individuals as reported at a given moment—and then aggregating
them.324 If humanity stays focused only on the welfare of the
individual, we, as a species, will be more likely to fail at the
hands of our own selfishness. WBA takes no account of the
possibility of too many individuals with too much impact or too
deep and wide a collective footprint. There are limits, but they are
not implicit in the measurement of individual well-being. They
are the Earth’s physical limits.
Scientifically speaking, well-being analysis is happiness
analysis, not risk analysis. With WBA, we evaluate brief glimpses
of satisfaction by having people pick a number out of the air in a
subjective evaluation ignorant of humanity’s greater situation.
WBA analysis does not look at risk. It fails to protect us. It is not
designed to do so.325 Its purpose is to measure happiness.
Further, as WBA counts only the happiness of the individual, it
fails to take account of the needs of the larger group or of other
groups. Both aspects of WBA, a lack of risk analysis and a myopic
selfish individual analysis, taken together, multiply the risk to
humanity.
Unfortunately, WBA takes no special account of death. Death
is merely a zero on the WBA scale of well-being.326 And, given the
effect of averaging people’s individual evaluations, death, an
eventual reality for all of us, can never be predicted with WBA.

323. Both CBA and WBA render life’s decision-making into a series of
evaluations, each with a unitary metric. However, a unitary metric does an
inadequate job of describing the complexity of each of our situations, let alone
humanity’s collective situation.
324. “The measure of welfare for a period of any duration is the aggregate
of a person’s moment-by-moment experiences of positive and negative feeling.”
JOHN BRONSTEEN ET AL., supra note 321, at 157.
325. WBA fails to interview the people who are dead, especially those who
have lost their lives by risks imposed by others.
326. There are other problems with zero well-being. Consider Ori J.
Herstein, Why ‘Nonexistent People’ Do Not Have Zero Wellbeing but No
Wellbeing At All, 30 J. APPLIED PHIL. 136 (2013).
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What’s worse, as with CBA, there is no special protection or
precaution for the life of others in the WBA decision procedure.
The lives of those who have not consented to the risk go
unprotected. As we maximize individual happiness and wellbeing in the face of foreseeably-catastrophic risk, WBA merely
replaces the property interest in CBA with a liberty interest in
happiness, as the primary interest. Unfortunately, each has the
fatal deficiency of possibly placing its respective interest higher
than the lives of other individuals and groups.
With this, I conclude my analysis of the objective view of risk.
The objective view fails to protect humanity individually and
collectively. Let us turn now from the quantitative view to a
qualitative view.
2. The Moral View of Risk
Westerners tend to analyze laws and regulations in view of
economic costs and benefits. However, economics does not
consider all motivations. Economics cannot tell us about the
worth of other people—or the significance of their rights327—but
economics tries to place a value on those lives. For example,
Harvard’s Donald Shepard and Richard Zeckhauser use
“willingness to pay” to place a dollar value on the survival of
individual lives.328 Through their economic lens, they envision
and build models to evaluate and make decisions that affect the
fundamental right to life based purely on economic
considerations.
Decision analysis based only on economic considerations is
problematic. Is there a moral leader who would condone the
placement of a price on the taking of an innocent human life?
How do we take into account the rights of those people? When do
we implement protection of the most fundamental right, the right
to life—before or after the loss? As you think about your life—and
your rights—you know the answer.

327. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 229.
328. Technically, these are reductions in risk of death at various ages. See
Donald S. Shepard & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Survival Versus Consumption, 30
MGMT. SCI. 423, 423 (1984).
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Human behavior is not based purely on self-interest. Neither
are human values.329 We have many motivations, and the social
and scientific natures of our existence show that we cannot be
entirely self-centered. This is but one of many possible moral
virtues. If humanity needs moral virtues, so do economists.330
Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling explain that we
cannot be entirely mechanical in our approach either:
“[E]conomists dream of decision rules so precise that no one will
need to participate.” They should see Kenneth Arrow’s Social
Choice and Individual Values,331 “a classic work in economic
theory,” as demonstrating “the impossibility of that dream.”332
Instead we must allow for the voice of the people:
In 1951, Kenneth Arrow proved that the results of democratic
decision making cannot be reproduced by a mathematical
formula. This crucial result, known as Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem, derailed earlier attempts by economists to represent
society’s choices by a “social welfare function”—a quantitative
description of what society supposedly prefers. Arrow’s proof has

329. Spanish sociologist and comparative political thinker Ignacio SánchezCuenca observes: “If people really act out of principles, moral obligations,
convictions, or sincere concern for others, the methodological virtues of a theory
that does not take into account these factors are of no avail.” Ignacio SánchezCuenca, A Preference for Selfish Preferences; The Problem of Motivations in
Rational Choice Political Science, 38 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 361, 372 (2008). Economic
theory fails us. “That theory could only aspire to provide very incomplete
explanations. Common sense, folk psychology, and even simple introspection
show that the range of motivations that move the agent to act is wider than
standard self-interest.” Id. Sánchez-Cuenca is correct. Neo-classical economics
fails to capture all values. Traditional rational choice theory (using models of
bounded rationality, evolutionary game theory, etc.) does not account for “the
importance of extreme behavior in politics (from suicide missions to joining
revolution to volunteering for altruist causes).” Id. at 375. Humanity needs to
open its eyes to motivations that are not economic.
330. David Lipka, Do Economists Need Moral Virtues? (June 12, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2449221 [https://perma.cc/TV5Q-AMD7]. Specifically,
economists need to honor the moral virtue of the survival of humanity.
331. KENNETH J. ARROW, COWLES COMM’N FOR RESEARCH IN ECON., SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
(John
Wiley
&
Sons,
1951),
http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/mon/m12-all.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5M4B-WM9B].
332. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 209.
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not been refuted, though it may have been forgotten, in the rush
to apply cost-benefit analysis.333

Decisions cannot be mechanical or mechanically applied. Life
is bumpy; nature is not smooth or mechanical. When we
encounter sufficient bumps, we lose control. There is a need for
humanity to be directly involved in our “human decisions.”
Humanity should not give up control to machines, to science, or to
economics.
At the same time, we should not turn our backs entirely on
the benefits of measurements or predictions. Providing for a
future is a matter of great complexity requiring a wide view.334
Unfortunately, our narrow-beam spotlights also happen to be
very short-range and near term. We need to look beyond the
foreseeability of extinction—and we need some faith in that
vision.
Too much moral flexibility can reduce our view and add to
risk. If we attach moral values to the views of certain risks, we
may be able to reduce the flexibility of some views,335 give
ourselves some guidance, and change the way we see and
approach those risks.336 We can do this whether the risks are

333. Id. (citing Frank Ackerman, Utility and Welfare II: Modern Economic
Alternatives, in HUMAN WELL-BEING AND ECONOMIC GOALS 81-92 (Frank
Ackerman et al., eds. 1997)). See also Peter Bernholz, A General Constitutional
Possibility Theorem, 51 PUB. CHOICE 249 (1986); Peter J. Hammond, Social
Choice: The Science of the Impossible?, in ARROW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
ECONOMIC POLICY 116 (George R. Feiwel, ed. 1987); Kotaro Suzumura &
Yongsheng Xu, Welfarist-Consequentialism, Similarity of Attitudes, and Arrow’s
General Impossibility Theorem, 22 SOC. CHOICE 237 (2004), for more on Arrow’s
Impossibility Theorem.
334. For Ackerman and Heinzerling, there are subtle considerations: “It is
of course helpful, when evaluating broad public policies, to quantify everything
that is measurable, to price everything that can be priced—while remembering
how many essential values are not illuminated by these narrow-beam numerical
spotlights.” ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 212. Not all weighing
works, and we don’t have to achieve perfect efficiency when contexts may vary.
“The nature of risks involved, the questions of fairness and distribution of
burdens, and the importance of providing for the future, all affect the policies
that should be adopted to protect health and the environment.” Id. at 212–13.
335. For instance, we may choose to value life and health over convenience,
property, or even liberty.
336. Paradoxically, as we shall see, we will need more behavioral flexibility,
individually and collectively, to avoid issues of life and death.
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based on behavior that is scientific or social and cultural in origin
and type.
Is there anything in objectivity that can help us see the moral
issues of our existence? How can moral issues ever be objective?
We can see shades of gray in morality. But there is one place with
no gray: the boundary of life and death.
If there is risk in a truly objective sense, it occurs with the
moral issue of that boundary. Some life and death is beyond our
control. However, when humans have control over that boundary,
the risk is moral in nature. For many individual risks, traditional
CBA may be employed and a rational weighing can take place.
But if human extinction is within our control, it may be the only
truly objective societal risk, one that inherently defies someone’s
special subjective perception or interest: the high power line you
just don’t touch no matter what the cost. If the risk is real and
significant, it is the black and white risk, with no shades of gray;
and with no weighing in making the decision itself.
Should we attempt to keep humanity alive at all costs? How
come? Or should we not knowingly further the extinction of
humanity? The latter certainly sounds right, but we should
consider all these questions and more.
Objective views of risk cannot cope with the issue of
extinction. Objective views involve measuring with numbers and
quantifying both the costs and the benefits: weighing. Using
objective risk or otherwise, can there be any weighing involving
the life and death of our own species? If there is weighing, we
have degraded ourselves. Human extinction is morally
repugnant. What benefit, what amount of profit, for example,
could ever be great enough to justify that cost? This is one of the
arguments against employing objective views of risk (including
neo-classical economics), or at least against using cost-benefit
analysis in its pure form. In light of possible extinction, morality
and fairness require more than cost-justified precaution.
Gregory Keating sees everyday application of that fairness as
he considers risk in the workplace.337 He correctly concludes that
337. Keating, supra note 20, at 699.
The fact . . . that a particular level of pesticide residue on produce, or
a particular level of benzene or cotton dust in a workplace,
maximizes the wealth that society extracts from the activity at issue
does not supply those who stand to lose their health or their lives
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great wealth for society does not justify placing lives in harm’s
way. Fairness requires something more than higher pay for those
who suffer the risks. Additional precaution is justified.
a. Basic Moral Law
We start with the most basic and simple moral law:
Thou shalt not kill.338

There it is in gleaming simplicity, without exceptions or
loopholes. At the largest level, this moral imperative is best noted
in the unwritten international criminal law of crimes against
humanity. Let us differentiate here between killing others and
killing ourselves.
i.

Killing Others

In this article, we consider combinations of global risks that,
with reasonable foreseeability, may lead to death for millions.
The law that was born of the death of millions of Jews is found in
international criminal law.
The prosecutions at the Nuremberg trials were for crimes
against humanity. Arguably, those same rights that were invoked
in Nuremberg reach out and touch and protect each and every
one of us. Each of us should be entitled to full and equal
protection under the law.
Gross negligence with the entire life support system of the
planet should be no less culpable than the specific intent required
to prove a case of genocide in international criminal law. The
purpose of this expression of international criminal law is not to
with good reason to accept the level of risk that efficiency licenses.
Society is extracting maximum advantage from the activity by
putting them in peril of great and readily avoidable harm. If the
sacrifice demanded of them could be avoided without imposing a
comparable sacrifice on others, then the risk should be reduced
Id. Prior consent, whether or not in the course of employment, is not enough to
justify placing lives or health at significant risk. As Aditi Bagchi explains it,
“[p]ermission cannot prevent culpability.” Aditi Bagchi, Managing Moral Risk:
The Case of Contract, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1878, 1902 (2011). For risk-taking
with significant risks to life or health to be morally acceptable, we reduce risk to
the extent feasible.
338. Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17.
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create criminals but to avoid the need for prosecution or the
results that come from failure.
If the human imperative is to protect life, we must rank it
highly. Life is a fundamental right in the due process clauses of
the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States. Life is first, ahead of liberty and property in
order—and in rank. Property and liberty support life, and
property supports liberty. The ranking of fundamental rights
becomes important when property rights come in conflict with
lives in being. We should work to avoid inversions in order to save
lives.
ii. Killing Yourself
The ancient prohibition applies here as well. Not only do
most states forbid suicide,339 there are other reasons to avoid
certain death. One of those reasons is our view of risk. Without
getting to the matter of intent, we try not to be negligent with our
own lives.
Consider the hot third rail of an electric train-line. As
individuals, we know not to come close. Touching that rail means
certain death. Such foreseeability requires that we talk about
other options long before we would get close to that rail.
Generally, we require a margin of safety.
Humanity needs that kind of decision-making—as a group.
In the process, we may need to recognize that there are some
actions for which we cannot punish. However, it may be to our
greater benefit if we were to “nudge” against those actions—to
limit their occurrence and their impact.340
We, as a species, need to start engineering the human
future—or, given our direction, our momentum, and our

339. See Scott P. Johnson & Robert M. Alexander, The Rehnquist Court and
the Devolution of the Right to Privacy, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 621, 642 n.178 (2003);
David LaValle, Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Is There a Right to Die?, 31
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 944, 953 n.73 (1998).
340. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (the classic text in
behavioral economics); Phil Weiser & Gideon Parchomovsky, Beyond Fair Use,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 91 (2010) (discussing how nudges may be used to increase
user access and use privileges in the realm of copyright, and showing that
nudging has a wide range of uses).

81

DRAPER - FINAL

238

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

4/28/2016 1:47 PM

[Vol. 33

overshoot, humanity itself will harm the health and the existence
of many millions of current lives in being.
There is a spectrum of different methods and manners of
dealing with risk. At one end, there is unrestricted cost-benefit
analysis, which allows for greater risk in the name of efficiency
and greater overall societal profit. CBA has no risk boundaries.
At the other end there is the precautionary principle,341 a rule
against risk.
Any number of stops, gradations, or possibilities may exist in
between. We will examine irreversibility, the source of the
precautionary principle. Then we’ll look at the principle itself.
b. Irreversibility
In its pure form, the precautionary principle commands:
“Better safe than sorry.” It is black and white; it is red and green.
A decision is required. You do it or you don’t. In its pure form,
there can be no measures. The outcome of the risk is treated as
irreversible.
Irreversibility plays a huge role in such domains as public
health, medical practice, and environmental protection. Each is a
context involving life and death of some living beings or thing(s)
(e.g., viruses and plants). Irreversibility is implicit in the
precautionary principle.
According to Cass Sunstein, there are “two separate
conceptions” of how to deal with irreversibility. One involves the
option value, which “calls for a kind of ‘irreversibility premium,’
embodied in a willingness to spend more on precautions or
preparation.”342 We’ll see more on that shortly. The other
“emphasizes losses of goods that are incommensurable . . . in the

341. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 223–29. Ackerman and
Heinzerling employ four principles to protect the priceless. One is the
precautionary principle, to be discussed shortly. The other three principles use a
holistic evaluation of costs and benefits, id. at 210–16, learn from the military
about the communication and power of moral imperatives without cost
comparison, and promote fairness toward those who don’t have a say, including
the poor, the powerless, and the future (our children and theirs), id. at 216–23,
229–33.
342. Irreversibility, supra note 264, at 230.
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sense that they are qualitatively distinctive and in some cases
unique.”343
Consider incommensurability. Some things, like life, are not
fungible with the value of the goods and services necessary to
sustain them. Compare the value of the food and water necessary
to sustain a city of 60,000 for a year, or even five years, with the
value of the future lives of those 60,000 people. Those people are
irreplaceable.
In
their
uniqueness,
their
lives
are
incommensurable with the value required to sustain them.
The loss of the unique is irreversible, and, as each human life
is unique, special precautions are needed. We know we are not
replaceable. Incommensurability touches deep emotional and
religious chords. According to Sunstein, “When people fear or
deplore certain losses, this kind of irreversibility is often their
Irreversibility invokes questions of
animating concern.”344
incommensurability, for example the difference between buying
and dying. “What is gained by an understanding of
incommensurability is a more vivid appreciation of why certain
losses cannot be dismissed as mere ‘costs.’”345
Special
precautions are required where losses are incommensurable with
each other.
But Professor Sunstein sees the problem for the option value
people in traditional economics: “Economists and economic
analysts of law often find [the idea of incommensurability]
puzzling and opaque, in part because it is outside the scope of

343. Id. (emphasis added).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 238. Sunstein elaborates:
To say that a social loss is not commensurate with money, in a moral
sense, is not to say that human beings can avoid some form of
monetization. The point is that in the domains of private choice and
democratic judgement, any monetary assignment should be
undertaken with an understanding of the nature of the goods at
stake. As I have emphasized, this point does not provide any
guidance for resolving the important issue of how the assignment of
monetary value should occur. But for those concerned about
irreversibility in the relevant sense, that is not the only issue. We
need to consider ‘how’ goods are valued, not merely ‘how much’ goods
are valued.
Id. at 239. Sunstein’s concept of social loss does not begin to convey the
significance of human extinction. Despite Sunstein’s interest in monetary
assignment, we can place no monetary value on human extinction.
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neoclassical (or behavioral) economics, and because it does not
offer any guidance for how to assess the costs and benefits of
social harms.”346 These option value people are often the
cornucopian economists347 who subscribe to pure cost-benefit
analysis for all decision making. An additional “option value” is
the value of irreversibility to them.348 This captures the extra
value for an investment to be potentially irreversible. The option
value approach may work well for the loss of property.
Thus, we have two ways of looking at the problem. Each side
has difficulties appreciating the other. On one side, there are
those who identify a value or a price for irreversible losses, or at
least the risk of such losses.349 On the other, the likes of Frank
Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling argue, “It is hard to imagine a
price for an irreversible loss.”350 It can depend on the nature of
the loss. If I lose my childhood photos to a fire, it is irreversible,
but not commensurable with other property. There is a special
emotional value. But instead of worrying about protecting other
property, this article is concerned with protecting life first. Life,
and the liberty which supports it, deserve special treatment as
they are consistently incommensurable with the property right
inherent in the option value approach.
Cass Sunstein suggests “that economic analysts will be
unable to understand important debates, in politics, in law, and

346. Id. at 230.
347. “The economist is focused on production and consumption. . . . The
planet, he insists, is perpetually fruitful and still underutilized.” WILSON, supra
note 18, at 24. On the other hand, “[t]he ecologist . . . is focused on
unsustainable crop yields, overdrawn aquifers, and threatened ecosystems. . . .
The planet he insists is exhausted and in trouble.” Id. The “cornucopian view of
nature” constitutes “the idea that nature is a vast storehouse of good ‘things’
waiting only to be grasped and used by man.” RICHARD L. MEANS, THE ETHICAL
IMPERATIVE: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN VALUES 126 (1969). Picture a verdant and
welcoming commons.
348. The option value of irreversible investments is one of three
independent literatures in economics pertaining to irreversibility. Beyond
“irreversible investments” is the literature of irreversibility and hysterisis in the
study of dynamic systems with multiple equilibria, and the literature of
entrainment, the phenomenon of lock-in or lock out, based in complex systems
theory. Charles Perrings & William Brock, Irreversibility in Economics, 1 ANN.
REV. RESOURCE ECON. 219, 219 (2009).
349. See Irreversibility, supra note 264, at 231 (citing Richard C. Bishop,
Option Value: An Exposition and Extension, 58 LAND ECON. 1 (1982)).
350. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 185.
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in ethics, unless they have a sympathetic appreciation of the
second conception of irreversibility.”351 Further, he notes “that
economic analysis of some public health and environmental
problems is, in an important sense, obtuse, if it fails to appreciate
the animating concern.”352 Sunstein conveys well the significance
of the limits of the neo-classical economic mind.353 For one thing,
he recognizes “that an effort to line up all the relevant goods on a
single metric will make it difficult to understand what is at stake
in the domains and politics of law.”354 The use of a unitary
metric obscures risk.
However, Sunstein builds an option value into his
“Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.” Relying on Kenneth
Arrow and Anthony Fisher’s 1974 economics essay,
Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility,355
Sunstein gives a purely economic response.

get:

351. Irreversibility, supra note 264, at 230.
352. Id.
353. According to Sunstein, here is what neo-classical economists do not

[Consider] a claim that natural processes have some kind of intrinsic
value simply because they are natural. If that idea seems
implausible or contentious, at least we might be able to agree that
certain decisions would produce losses that are in a moral sense
irreversible even if that claim seems mysterious from the standpoint
of economic theory.
Id. at 238 (citing ROBERT GOODIN, GREEN POLITICAL THEORY 41 (1992)).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 233
Arrow and Fisher imagine that the question is whether to preserve a
virgin redwood forest for wilderness recreation or instead to open it
to clear-cut logging. Assume that if the development option is
chosen, the destruction of the forest is effectively irreversible. Arrow
and Fisher argue that it matters whether the authorities cannot yet
assess the costs or benefits of a proposed development. If
development produces ‘some irreversible transformation of the
environment, hence a loss in perpetuity of the benefits from
preservation’, then it is worth paying something to wait to acquire
the missing information. Their suggestion is that ‘the expected
benefits of an irreversible decision should be adjusted to reflect the
loss of options it entails’.
Id. (citing Kenneth Arrow & Anthony Fisher, Environmental Preservation,
Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON. 312, 319 (1974)).
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Interpreting an argument in a later paper by Fisher,356
Sunstein invokes an insurance payment step-by-step process.
Here he shows the implementation:
If an irreversible harm is on one side and a reversible one on the
other, and if decision-makers are uncertain about future costs
and benefits of precautions, an understanding of option value
suggests that it is worthwhile to spend a certain amount to
preserve future flexibility, by paying a premium to avoid the
irreversible harm.357

There is an additional cost to preserve an option. The
usefulness of the option approach is direct knowledge and
exercise of flexibility in seeking to protect the irreversible.
But this does not help us with our values. The option
approach will not help us decide whether or not to avoid our own
extinction. While it may help analyze costs, in its unrestricted
form the option approach is unlikely to help determine the most
effective approach(es) to take in the interest of safety. When
liberty or life is placed at risk, the situation calls for a moral
response.
It is possible to misinterpret irreversibility in the context of
human extinction. Considering irreversibility, the focus should be
on safety first, not cost first. According to the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing [regulatory] measures, taking into account that
policies and measures to deal with climate change should be costeffective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible
cost.358

“Global benefits” can come without making any expenditure
toward security. There is a sufficient safety interest to protect
356. See Anthony C. Fisher, Uncertainty, Irreversibility, and the Timing of
Climate Change Policy 9 (2001), http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/
Publications/PDF_Papers/timingFfisher.pdf [perma.cc/5YYB-DPAL].
357. Irreversibility, supra note 264, at 233.
358. UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164, 170; see also INDUR
GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 6 (2001) (quoting United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, art. 3(3)).
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first from the most significant risks. Those risks are not limited
to climate change. Cost could become a factor once a measure of
safety has been calculated and established.
Feasibility may at some point be an issue. However, some
goals may not appear to be feasible at first. We may decide we
need to train ourselves to reach. Or maybe we merely need to
time our jump. We need to begin a conversation on how we, all of
humanity, need to view significant risk.
c. The Precautionary Principle
The risks of contracting HIV/AIDS or playing with guns are
black and white and do not tend to come in shades of gray. If you
ask a parent, these are objective risks that any adult can
recognize. And these are great risks, deserving special treatment.
Although our treatment of these risks may vary in relation to our
circumstances and our views,359 we tend to readily accept that
these represent great risks at one end of the spectrum of risk.
This black and white view has led to the “better safe than
sorry” argument that teenagers have heard for years. This is the
root of a concept called the precautionary principle: The principle
tells us that, given the risks, there are some boundaries you just
don’t cross. Even though the risk may be indeterminate, there
may be a general perception of danger.360 Consider horrific

359. For example, we may lock up the guns, or we may refuse to allow guns
in our homes.
360. Law professor Steven Schwarcz describes treatment of catastrophic
risk created by our systems:
Perhaps the most relevant example for systemic risk is regulation
designed to address the risk of catastrophic events or large,
irreversible effects where the actual level of risk is indeterminate. In
these cases, regulators often apply a precautionary principle that
presumes benefits will outweigh costs. In the principle’s most
utilized form, regulators may decide to regulate an activity
notwithstanding lack of decisive evidence of the activity’s harm, such
as controlling low-level exposure to carcinogens notwithstanding
lack of proof of a causal connection between such exposure and
adverse effects to human health.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 234-35 (2008) (citing
JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
16 (2d ed. 2007); Robert G. Chambers & Tigran A. Melkonyan, Pareto Optimal
Trade in an Uncertain World: GMOs and the Precautionary Principle, 89 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 520, 528 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic,
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mortal injury, incurable disease, or death to self or others. These
are clear boundaries to which any parent—or physician361—
would agree.
We need to plan for risk in our law and policy so that later we
do not regrettably discover that we were too late in risk
assessment and communication. Reactions can be too late. As
Princeton’s Richard Falk observed 40 years ago, “we tend too
often to react, rather than to prevent and given the scale of our
newer undertakings the consequences of error are increasing at a
fast pace.”362 Finding ourselves lucky enough to be here now does
not justify continuing to react rather than prevent. The risks in
science—and the risks seen through science—are increasing
faster now than ever. Reaction, at some point, will be inadequate.
The precautionary principle may help us morally. It may help
us with our thinking. And it may help us with single individual
simple choices. But life is not so simple. According to Ackerman
and Heinzerling, “The general idea of the precautionary principle
is easy enough to describe: we should pay attention to early
warnings of serious hazards, rather than wait for final proof and
precise quantification of the expected impacts. The difficulty
comes in implementation.”363 Practically speaking, how do we
live? Do we stop eating? Do we stop burning coal? What do we
change, and to what degree? Here is what we are up against: We
already know that we can’t lock the teenager in his room all his
life.364 We must accept some risk.
If we reject unrestricted cost-benefit analysis entirely, and
we attempt to deal with risk with the black-or-white banning of
dangerous activity, at this point, we cannot live.365 We are all
91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 848 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary
Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1006-07, 1017-18 n.266 (2003)).
361. The precautionary principle “is, essentially, a restatement of a popular
rendition of the Hippocratic oath, namely, ‘first do no harm.’” GOKLANY, supra
note 359, at 1–2.
362. FALK, supra note 57, at 190.
363. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 225.
364. We must at some point be able to take risk. It is part of normal
individual development.
365. Keating offers the example of a tanker truck full of gasoline, an
accident, an explosion, waiting to happen. Although it is a threat to our
community of risk, it is also a benefit. We need that fuel, and we are willing to
accept some risk of devastating injury or death to some in our community to get
it. Losses will be concentrated on an unlucky few. Keating, supra note 20, at
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together in this larger community of risk, and as we will see when
we consider the risks in our modern everyday life, some
stemming from our everyday conveniences, we cannot employ the
raw dictates of the precautionary principle. We would lose our
liberty.
Do we subject all risks to special precaution beyond the point
of cost justification? Hardly. Professor Keating suggests that it
behooves us to eliminate or feasibly reduce only significant risks
of devastating injury: “[A] significance requirement is necessary
to prevent both safe and feasible risk reduction from inflicting
harms to our liberty greater than the harms that insignificant
risks of devastating injury inflict on our security.”366 All risks
would not qualify for these restrictions.367 “The imposition of
insignificant—but real—risks of devastating injury is so
pervasive that the elimination of insignificant risks of
devastating injury would cripple our freedom of action.”368 One
could respond that human extinction is significant if anything
is.369
Economists and others have attacked the precautionary
principle, saying that it cannot be employed in its pure form and
that when it is employed, it is vague, ambiguous, and watered
down.370 Let’s not allow ourselves to be restricted to an all-or679. Keating then asks and answers the hard question, “[w]hat can be said by
way of justification to those who lose?” Id. at 680,
The only answer is that the relevant practices of risk imposition
were to their ex ante advantage and that their lives and limbs were
not, therefore, sacrificed either to the general good, or to the lesser
interests of others. There was no alternative way of reconciling
liberty and security which would have improved their life prospects,
and perhaps have avoided their devastation, without working a
greater hardship on another class of persons.
Id. at 680.
366. Id. at 661.
367. We need to place life interests over liberty interests, but only where
risks to life and health are significant.
368. Keating, supra note 20, at 661.
369. Significance is not a question of probability but a question of how bad
it would be if it happened. This then justifies an investigation into probability.
370. See John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 13 (2002); Michael S. Carolan, The
Precautionary Principle and Traditional Risk Assessment, 20 ORG. & ENV’T 5
(2007); Giovanni Immordino, Self-Protection, Information and the Precautionary
Principle, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. THEORY 179 (2000); Derek Turner &
Lauren Hartzell, The Lack of Clarity in the Precautionary Principle, 13 ENVTL.
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nothing choice between a norm with excessive risk (CBA) and a
principle that arguably cannot be implemented as such.371 We
like safety.372 When confronted with the choice, most people
choose safety over money.373
When we choose liberty or property over life, we have
misplaced our priorities. Look at externalities. When property
conflicts arise and it comes down to the right to achieve efficiency
and in doing so, to pollute, versus the right of another to be free of
pollution, we encounter conflicting priorities. For economist
Ronald Coase, the issue should not be which interest to protect so
much as how best “to avoid the more serious harm.”374 This
VALUES 449 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, The Precautionary Principle as a Basis for
Decision Making, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, Apr. 2005.
371. Consider this attack on the precautionary principle by well-known
CBA proponent, Judge Posner:
The “precautionary principle” (“better safe than sorry”) popular in
Europe and among Greens generally is not a satisfactory alternative
to cost-benefit analysis, if only because of its sponginess—if it is an
alternative at all. In its more tempered versions, the principle is
indistinguishable from cost-benefit analysis with risk aversion
assumed. Risk aversion, as we know, entails that extra weight be
given the downside of certain prospects. In effect it magnifies certain
costs, but it does not thereby overthrow cost-benefit analysis, as
some advocates of the precautionary principle may believe.
POSNER, supra note 145, at 140. The thumb on the scale of safety is an
acknowledgment that CBA fails to adequately account for risk. The long-term
interest in safety is a countervailing tendency to the interest in short-term gain
inherent in CBA. The purposes are different. Neither can entirely displace the
other.
372. Ackerman and Heinzerling observe that the U.S. military
establishment successfully avoids CBA based on safety or security
considerations. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 15, at 216–20. When
safety has mattered most, Americans have not used CBA:
Advocates of Cold War military spending could have seen the
situation in terms much like our interpretation of the precautionary
principle. The actual military risk was uncertain, and the danger of
being exposed to attack in the high-risk case seemed much greater
than the danger of spending too much in the low-risk case. Preparing
for the high-risk case did not bankrupt the nation, but created jobs
and industries that sustained economic growth.
Id. at 228. The same could easily be said for the health and environmental risks
we face today. Consider, e.g., the costs of a catastrophic climate change disaster.
When we compare it to the cost of preventative safety, we discover that the costs
are not symmetrical.
373. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 18, at 125.
374. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2
(1960).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/2

90

DRAPER - FINAL

2016]

4/28/2016 1:47 PM

NEO-CLASSICAL ECONOMICS

247

approach better supports—or at least works better with—
precaution than does CBA.
When we consider externalities, we often see “market
failure.” Law professor Carl Circo notes that, “[u]nder
[circumstances of market failure], economic analysis supports a
legal rule that ‘avoids the greater harm,’ such as a rule that
imposes ‘the burden (or duty) of cost avoidance or abatement on
the party that can do so at the lowest cost.’”375 If we are not
careful, decisions to avoid harm can all too easily get recharacterized into issues of cost. When we consider humanity’s
impact on the life support system of the planet, lowest cost may
not avoid greater harm.
For now, we have considered risk, something we all live and
know. How we perceive risk and how we respond varies in the
context of “objective” views, subjective views, and moral views.
Let’s recognize a moral need, even a legal need, to reduce risk
especially when we encounter the irreversible. And let’s recognize
that need especially in the context of risk of death and extinction,
including foreseeable risk of harm to the Earth’s life support
system.
Is humanity at any risk of extinction? Are there real dangers
or just concerns? Are these matters that dollars and cents will
solve, or do they run deeper?376 The foreseeability of collapse is
not reassuring.

375. Circo, supra note 165, at 120 (quoting DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z.
GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 87 (2005)).
376. Money may not solve the problems discussed herein. How to Spend
$50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place, examines nine different categories
of possible options. Of those, only two—climate change and safe and adequate
water—pertain directly to issues in this article. The options are ranked by
economists setting economic priorities. Climate change and water do not make it
into the group of four top priorities (1. control of HIV/AIDS; 2. providing
micronutrients to fight malnutrition among children; 3, trade liberalization; and
4. control of malaria). See Jagdish N. Bhagwati et al., Expert Panel Ranking, in
HOW TO SPEND $50 BILLION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE 165, 166 (Bjorn
Lomborg ed., 2006); Bjorn Lomborg, Introduction: What Should We Do First?, in
HOW TO SPEND $50 BILLION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE, at xi, xiii, xv
(Bjorn Lomborg ed., 2006). In some ways, it can be said that the top priorities
selected are the “easy” issues.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Neo-classical economics and its purely quantitative approach
to decision making should be replaced by theory and practice that
do a better job of protecting humanity from significant risk of
collapse or extinction. Implementation of neo-classical theory
puts individual lives at risk and when multiplied on a grand
scale, works against the common welfare of the population. In
response, sociologists, and the late Ulrich Beck in particular,
employ a subjective view of risk that is both outspoken and
wary.377
The philosophical footing for neo-classical economics is part
of the problem. The utilitarian theory common to CBA and WBA
is incompatible with a long future on a limited planet. Humans
exhibit plenty of self-interest already, without employing
specialized systems to magnify it.
The use of utilitarian philosophy causes us to focus on our
own individual perceptions of need, without regard to the
physical limits of the planet. As a result, we are selfishly using up
significant portions of the life support system of the planet—and
thereby impairing the human future.378
Our neo-classical economics has become a specialized system
that is assisting in environmental disaster. It may be true at this
stage that each effort to use nature harms the biosphere a bit
more.
While we lack a perfect understanding of scientific cause and
effect, we can understand and foresee the possibilities for
environmental disaster. Requiring proof of cause and effect for a
disaster is both impossible and immoral. The lessons of
Chernobyl, Bhopal, and the Deepwater Horizon spill teach us
that the kinds of life-and-death risk we face require more
precaution than is currently employed.
Known foreseeability enhances the duty to act. Arguably, an
intentional failure to act to save millions of lives could reasonably
constitute sufficient gross negligence to attract the attention of

377. See, e.g., BECK, supra note 19.
378. This paves the way for us to consider the question of what approach or
philosophy to use. We will need to explore and consider ways to think about
thinking that will further the survival of the human species.
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criminal authorities. Instead, humanity should embrace a duty to
act that is rooted in both morality and law.
With risk to life foreseeable, certain activities should be
curtailed. A humanity interested in survival will need new limits
on behavior. And law will need to have a role in setting those
limits including limiting systems of decision making, such as
CBA. Law should govern economics rather than the other way
around.
The President’s Office of Information and Regulatory
Analysis (OIRA) needs to scrap its use of CBA immediately. In
the interest of fairness to all, it needs to be scrapped in all other
countries simultaneously. We can no longer afford to compete
against each other without limits. We are killing the planet.
Given our competitive economic systems, our best approach
is for all nations to agree to stop the competition. Thus, it seems
that the time and the situation are right for a new global
economic system that respects both science and the law. If we can
use our laws, our choices, and our defaults to encourage human
survival, we, as a species, stand a better chance of surviving
longer. And together we can make the world a better place.
I would stop here, but there remains a final troubling matter
to address: the matter of economic displacement. If the entire
international economic system were to move at once to some
system other than neo-classical economics, there would be
massive human displacement and suffering. The transition needs
to be phased in. It needs to start very soon, and we need to
discuss the required changes even sooner.
In the face of environmental overshoot, humanity cannot
continue as we have. Either we will adjust first, or collapse will
occur. Given our current economic and political systems, a
sufficient adjustment on the part of our species would require a
global effort at the highest levels. Given our tendency to continue
with previous behavior, it is reasonably foreseeable that failure to
cooperate in making sufficient changes could doom the human
species. For example, if we do not cooperatively outgrow neoclassical economics together, the divisions and discontinuities
from just a few competitors could lead to collapse. An affirmative
decision on the part of the human species is likely to be required.
And before that, we need to talk about the problems and the
possible solutions. Let the conversation begin, please.
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